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INVESTING IN VARIABLE INTEREST ENTITIES 
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“Some are calling it ‘bigger than Enron’ and ‘a bit of a 
Ponzi scheme.’” —New York Times1 
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INTRODUCTION 
An investor who buys shares on a stock exchange receives a 
piece of equity of the listed company.2 Typically, the listed 
company is either an operating company or a holding company 
that owns an equity stake in an operating company or 
companies.3 This, however, is not true of half of the businesses 
domiciled in the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) that are 
listed in the United States using the Variable Interest Entity 
(“VIE”) structure. 4  Under a VIE structure, a US investor 
purchases shares in an offshore entity, typically a shell company 
domiciled in the Cayman Islands, which owns neither a revenue-
                                                                                                                            
2. See, e.g., Stock Market Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/stock%20exchange (last visited Dec. 19, 2013) (“A system or 
place where shares of various companies are bought and sold”); Equity Market 
Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/equitymarket.asp 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2013) (defining the stock market as giving companies capital and 
investors a slice of ownership in a company). 
3. See, e.g., Holding Company Definition, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 257 (9th ed. 
2009) (characterizing a holding company as a company formed to control other 
companies and confines its role to owning stock and supervising management without 
participating in making day-to-day business decisions); HERVÉ STOLOWY & MICHEL 
LEBAS, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING, A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 454 (2006) 
(noting that a pure holding company’s sole purpose is to hold and manage its 
subsidiaries and does not directly engage in business operations). 
4. See Wong, supra note 1 (suggesting that more than half of the 200 Chinese 
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and the NASDAQ Stock 
Market (“NASDAQ”) use a Variable Interest Entity (“VIE”) structure); Paul Gillis, 
Statistics on VIE Usage, CHINA ACCT. BLOG (Apr. 11, 2011, 7:20 PM), http://
www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/statistics-on-vie-usage.html (noting that about 
forty-seven percent and sixty-five percent of the Chinese businesses that went public on 
the NYSE and NASDAQ, respectively, used the VIE structure); David Schindelheim, 
Note, Variable Interest Entity Structures in the People’s Republic of China: Is Uncertainty for 
Foreign Investors Part of China’s Economic Development Plan?, 21 CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 195, 196 (2012) (explaining that foreign control is established over a PRC 
entity through contractual arrangement rather than equity ownership). 
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generating business operation nor equity in an operating 
company.5 The investor derives economic benefits solely from 
the contractual agreements between the listed entity and the 
underlying PRC-domiciled business.6 As such, a VIE investment 
is only as good as the validity of its underlying contracts.7 The 
combined market capitalization of US-listed PRC-domiciled VIEs 
was nearly US$100 billion as of September 2012, and is expected 
to reach US$300 billion by the end of 2014.8 
The VIE structure of PRC-domiciled businesses was created 
in 2000 to circumvent the PRC government’s restrictions barring 
non-PRC ownership of PRC companies in certain “sensitive” 
                                                                                                                            
5 . See, e.g., NetEase Inc., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 22, 2013) 
(documenting the places of incorporation to be in the Cayman Islands and principle 
executive offices in the PRC); RenRen Inc., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 23, 
2013); Sina Corp., Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Apr. 22, 2013). But see Chen Ke, “Rule 
by Law” and Its Impact on Cross-Border Transactions Affecting Chinese Interests, 34 T. 
JEFFERSON L. REV. 161, 166 (2011) (acknowledging the British Virgin Islands to be the 
other common destination for VIE shell companies). 
6. See Understanding the VIE Structure: Necessary Elements for Success, and the Legal 
Risks Involved, CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT 2 (Aug. 10, 2011), 
http://www.cadwalader.com/uploads/cfmemos/a6415b15f2ab1795be964c203f
513215.pdf [hereinafter CADWALADER, Understanding the VIE Structure] (“The key 
concept that underpins a VIE Structure is control over the Domestic Licensed Co 
through various service agreements . . . rather than through share ownership.”); Dune 
Lawrence, China Companies Evading Owner Rule with US Listings Frustrate Regulators, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 9, 2011), http://about.bloomberglaw.com/legal-news/china-
companies-evading (“Under U.S. accounting rules, the company in China is considered 
a ‘variable interest entity’ in which the U.S.- listed firm’s interest derives from the 
contractual relationship, not voting rights.”). 
7. See Dan Harris, Crouching Tiger, Hidden Fraud. Clear Speaking On VIEs., CHINA L. 
BLOG (July 16, 2011), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2011/07/crouching_tiger_
hidden_fraud_clear_speaking_on_vies.html (“[T]he contractual arrangements 
providing for control by the public company are only as strong as the enforcement 
mechanisms that can be effectively used – generally Chinese law and Chinese courts.”); 
William McGovern, SEC Probe Raises Uncertainty Over VIE Structures, S. CHINA MORNING 
POST (Jan. 23, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/
article/1133845/sec-probe-raises-uncertainty-over-vie-structures (cautioning about the 
enforceability of the VIE agreements connecting the foreign-owned offshore entity and 
the onshore operating VIE owned by PRC nationals). 
8. See Paul Gillis, Accounting Matters: Variable Interest Entities in China, FORENSIC 
ASIA GUEST SERIES (Sept. 18, 2011) (listing over one hundred US-listed PRC-domiciled 
companies in descending order of market capitalization as of September 2011); Vindu 
Goel, Michael J. de la Merced & Neil Gough, Chinese Giant Alibaba Will Go Public, Listing 
in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2014, 4:48 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/
06/alibaba-files-to-go-public-in-the-u-s (confirming that PRC’s “e-commerce behemoth” 
Alibaba Group has filed with the SEC for its IPO in New York and is expected by the 
market to be valued at roughly US$200 billion). 
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industry sectors, such as energy, technology, and value-added 
telecommunications.9 Notably, almost all of the largest US-listed 
PRC-domiciled internet companies use the VIE structure.10 To 
date, the PRC government has not directly addressed either the 
legality of the VIE structure or the validity of its underlying 
contracts.11 Nevertheless, recent actions by the PRC’s regulatory 
bodies have significantly exacerbated concerns over the 
structure’s fundamental viability.12 The murky legal and political 
landscape surrounding VIEs poses unusual challenges to the 
protection of US investor interests.13 
                                                                                                                            
9. See McGovern, supra note 9 (“Under Chinese law, certain industries—such as 
energy, technology and telecommunications—are considered sensitive, and companies 
are prevented from issuing stock to foreign investors. Some mainland companies 
operating in these sectors have adopted the VIE structure to gain access to foreign 
capital.”); Richard Pearson, Looking at Chinese VIE’s, FORBES (Oct. 18, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardpearson/2012/10/18/looking-at-chinese-vies 
(“Variable Interest Entity . . . structures were first introduced by Chinese companies 
listing in the US as far back as the year 2000 when SINA had its initial public offering 
on the NASDAQ.”). 
10. See David Barboza, A Loophole Poses Risks to Investors in Chinese Companies, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 23, 2012, 5:38 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/23/a-
loophole-poses-risks-to-investors-in-chinese-companies (pointing out that almost every 
major Chinese internet company has adopted the VIE structure); Sunny Ye, The Cash 
Reserves of China’s Internet Companies, TECHRICE (Oct. 2, 2011), http://techrice.com/
2011/10/02/chinas-internet-companies-ranked-by-cash-on-hand (listing the twenty-
seven largest overseas-listed PRC-domiciled VIEs in the internet business in terms of 
cash reserves, with US-listed NetEase and Baidu in top spots). 
11. See generally Stan Abrams, The VIE Meta-Narrative: Illegal vs. Invalid, CHINA 
HEARSAY BLOG (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.chinahearsay.com/the-vie-meta-narrative 
(distinguishing between the risk of a categorical declaration of the illegality of VIE as a 
financing structure and that of invalidation of the VIE contracts); Schindelheim, supra 
note 4, at 225 (arguing that the uncertainty is part of the CCP’s deliberate plan). 
12. See Gillis, supra note 8 (“There is a growing feeling that VIEs are becoming 
unworkable.”); An Update on China’s Variable Interest Entities: Navigating Regulations and 
Mitigating Risks for 2013, K&L GATES, (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.klgates.com/an-
update-on-chinas-variable-interest-entities—navigating-regulations-and-mitigating-risks-
for-2013-03-08-2013 (suggesting that the PRC government’s recent actions show its 
intention to crack down on VIEs). 
13. See Steven M. Davidoff, Alibaba Investors Will Buy a Risky Corporate Structure, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 6, 2014, 7:46 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/i-p-o-
revives-debate-over-a-chinese-structure (“The structure may be illegal under Chinese 
law since it conveniently circumvents those prohibitions on foreign investment.”); 
Dena Aubin, Investor Risk Lurks in Legal Structure of China IPOs–Lawyers, REUTERS (Nov. 
2, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/23/china-investments-idUSL2N0E
MPD20130623 (presenting the possible nightmare scenario, where the listed company 
loses control of the PRC firm’s assets, essentially wiping out its balance). 
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Part I of this Comment discusses the policy background, 
historical origin, common configuration, and the PRC’s current 
regulatory regime of the VIE structure. Part I also provides a 
brief overview of the role of the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) in regulating publicly-held VIEs in the 
United States. Part II examines the inherent legal and regulatory 
risks of investing in VIE entities and the limited legal recourse 
afforded to VIE investors. Part III recommends two regulatory 
actions the SEC may consider taking to better inform the 
investing public in the nature of VIEs. For the sake of focus and 
brevity, in this Comment, the term “PRC” refers only to 
mainland China, and the term “VIE” means only those variable 
interest entity structures that involve PRC-domiciled businesses 
publicly traded in the United States.14 
I. THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
Part I introduces the historical background that gave rise to 
the invention and popularity of VIEs and discusses its current 
regulatory environment. Part I.A examines the early days of the 
PRC’s foreign direct investment (“FDI”) policy, and the 
emergence of the industry-based investment restriction scheme 
of the 1970s as a direct result of the PRC’s Open-Door Policy. 
Part I.B investigates the rise and demise of the VIE’s 
predecessor, the China-China-Foreign (“CCF”) investment 
structure, and the subsequent rise of the VIE structure since 
2000. It also analyzes the typical structure of a VIE arrangement 
and the motives of its various participants. Part I.C reviews the 
PRC’s recent legislative and regulatory developments as well as 
the ongoing bilateral treaty negotiation affecting the VIE 
structure. Part I.D briefly addresses the regulatory role of the 
SEC in the US capital markets, particularly in relation to VIEs. 
                                                                                                                            
14 . See Mainland China, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mainland_
China  (last visited on Feb. 26, 2014) (“[A] geographical and political term to describe 
the geographical area under the direct jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) [that] generally excludes the PRC Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong 
and Macau”); Contra Variable Interest Entity—VIE, INVESTOPEDIA, http://
www.investopedia.com/terms/v/variable-interest-entity.asp (last visited on Dec. 19, 
2013) (defining VIE as any entity in which the investor has obtained less than a 
majority interest that is subject to consolidation if certain conditions exist). 
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A. Long-Held Policy of the People’s Republic of China: Restriction on 
Foreign Ownership in “Sensitive” Industries 
The PRC operates in a self-defined “socialist market 
economy” under the unitary rule of the Chinese Communist 
Party (“CCP”).15 During the Maoist era (1949–78), FDI in the 
PRC was practically non-existent.16 Historically, the dominant 
Confucian ideology had an anti-commercial tradition and 
assigned low social status to merchants.17 More recently, in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the PRC was colonized and 
exploited by Western military invasion and forced trade. 18 
Consequently, the newly-founded PRC felt intense hostility 
toward the West and a strong desire to regain autonomy of its 
trade and commerce.19 Self-reliance via import substitution was a 
                                                                                                                            
15. XIANFA pmbl. & art. 11 (1982) (China); see Vivienne Bath, Foreign Investment, 
the National Interest and National Security—Foreign Direct Investment in Australia and China, 
34 SYDNEY L. REV. 5, 6 (2012) (“China is a one-party unitary state which describes itself 
as being in ‘the primary stage of socialism’ and aiming to develop a ‘socialist market 
economy’.”). But see George Finch, Modern Chinese Constitutionalism: Reflections of 
Economic Change, 15 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 75, 94–102 (2007) (noting 
that the term did not appear in the PRC Constitution under its 1993 amendment to 
follow Deng Xiaoping’s call to introduce market economy into China). 
16. See Jinyan Li, The Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives and Implications for 
International Tax Debates (Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy Research 
Paper 05/2008, Vol. 04 No. 01, 2008) (“China had no foreign direct investment 
(“FDI”) before 1979.”); Stefan Kaiser et al., Foreign Direct Investment in China: An 
Examination of the Literature, in GREATER CHINA: POLITICAL ECONOMY, INWARD 
INVESTMENT, AND BUSINESS CULTURE 44 (Chris Rowley & Mark Lewis eds., 1996) 
(noting that FDI was allowed into the PRC with the announcement of the Open-Door 
policy). 
17. See XUEYUAN ZHANG ET AL., HISTORICAL ATTITUDES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
PATH DEPENDENCE: FDI DEVELOPMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN CHINA, ERIM 
REP. SERIES RES. IN MGMT. 11 (2004) (suggesting that the anti-commercial attitude in 
the Confucian Chinese state is related to its “traditional suspicion of merchants”); Four 
Occupations, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_occupations (last visited 
Dec. 17, 2013) (noting that under the hierarchical system in ancient China, traders and 
merchants had the lowest social rank). 
18. See Finch, supra note 15, at 77 (providing an overview of the series of 
unsuccessful attempts by the Chinese government to fight foreign aggression and 
forced trade); HUI FENG, The Road to the WTO, in THE POLITICS OF CHINA’S ACCESSION 
TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE DRAGON GOES GLOBAL 40, 41 (2006) 
(noting that as a result of China’s defeat in the two Opium Wars the country was forced 
to accept a humiliating treaty system under which foreign powers controlled Chinese 
tariffs and coastal trade). 
19. See ZHANG ET AL., supra note 17, at 14–16 (explaining how the Western 
domination and exploitation of China starting with the Opium War has contributed to 
Chinese protectionism); Axel Berger, The Politics of China’s Investment Treaty-Making 
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resounding theme of the Maoist era.20 The key turning point in 
the PRC’s path to modernization occurred after the demise of 
Mao Zedong and the disastrous Cultural Revolution.21 In 1978, 
in an effort to commence a much-needed economic reform, the 
new CCP leadership under Deng Xiaoping instituted the 
groundbreaking Open-Door Policy.22 The new policy advocated 
the use of “market mechanisms and foreign resources” to spur 
economic growth.23 It also marked the first time that the PRC 
welcomed non-PRC investments into the country. 24  On the 
                                                                                                                            
Program, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS LAW 162, 171 (Tomer Broude 
et al. eds., 2011) (discussing the PRC’s hostile view of Western investments as a means 
used by the imperialists to carry out “aggression, oppression and exploitation”). 
20. See ZHANG ET AL., supra note 17, at 19 (noting that the CCP used the import 
substitution approach to achieve its highly-emphasized goal of self-reliance); Import 
Substitution Industrialization (“ISI”), INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/i/importsubstitutionindustrialization.asp (last visited on Feb. 24, 2014) 
(“Implementation of [import substitution] focuses on protection and incubation of 
domestic infant industries so they may emerge to compete with imported goods and 
make the local economy more self-sufficient.”); Ross Terrill, China and the World: Self-
Reliance or Interdependence?, FOREIGN AFF., Jan. 1977, available at http://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/27034/ross-terrill/china-and-the-world-self-reliance-or-
interdependence (analyzing the sources of China’s principle of self-reliance from a 
historical and cultural standpoint). 
21. See, e.g., TANG TSOU, THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND POST-MAO REFORMS: A 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 144 (1986) (“The Third Plenery session . . . held in 
December 1978 may turn out to be the landmark of the beginning of a new historic era 
in China.”); Michael Elliot, Thirty Years After Deng: The Man Who Changed China, TIME, 
Dec. 10, 2008, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1865539,00.html 
(calling the Third Plenery session in 1978 the meeting that “laid the groundwork for a 
generation of economic reform”). 
22. See Kaiser et al., supra note 16 (examining the evolution of the CCP’s ideology 
and policy in the period); Alexander E. Csordas, Note, Funding Entrepreneurial Ventures 
in China: Proposals to More Effectively Regulate Chinese Foreign Private Issuers, 38 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 373, 376 (2012) (identifying the emergence of the Open Door Policy following 
Mao’s death). 
23. William I. Friedman, Alumni Article, One Country, Two Systems: The Inherent 
Conflict Between China’s Communist Politics and Capitalist Securities Market, 27 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 477, 477 (2002) (“Deng Xiaoping, adopted an ‘open door’ policy, centering 
on economic reforms utilizing market mechanisms and foreign resources to speed up 
the growth and modernization of the economy.”); Csordas, supra note 22, at 376 
(discussing the central theme of the Open Door Policy). 
24. See Yongnian Zheng, Reform, Openness and Social Policy in China, in CHINA’S 
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY: INTO THE NEXT STAGE? 19 (Litao Zhao ed., 2013) 
(“In the 30 years under Maoist Rule (1949-79), China’s doors were closed to the 
outside world, especially the West.”); Jeffrey K.D. Au, Note, The Hopes and Fears of 
Foreign Direct Investment: A Comparative Evaluation of FDI Regulation in the People’s 
Republic of China and Taiwan, 2 J. CHINESE L. 359, 359 (1988) (“Rejecting past policies 
of autarky and strict ‘self-reliance,’ the PRC embarked on a new path, which sought to 
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whole, the new leadership welcomed FDI because it attracted 
the capital and technical expertise necessary for accelerated 
economic growth. 25  FDI-friendly policies have ranged from 
preferential tax treatment of overseas investments to special 
trade zones for economic experimentation. 26  In the 1990s, 
economic reforms accelerated as the “conventional state 
planning system” transitioned into “a more market-oriented 
macro-economic regulation and control” regime. 27  This 
transition continued into the new millennium with the PRC’s 
joining the World Trade Organization in 2001.28  
While the new CCP leaders in the post-Mao era developed 
substantial and enduring policy changes for economic reform, 
they did not summarily reverse broad objectives from the 
previous era.29 Despite progressive policy changes, protectionism 
                                                                                                                            
encourage the transfer of advanced technology from abroad and the investment of 
foreign capital in the PRC.”). 
25. See, e.g., Ding Qingfen, Favorable FDI Policy is Essential, Says Report, CHINA 
DAILY (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011-11/30/content_
14186406.htm (commenting on the PRC’s intention to maintain a favorable FDI 
environment, as it facilitates the advancement of the nation’s economy); Foreign Direct 
Investment—The China Story, WORLD BANK (July 16, 2010), http://www.worldbank.org/
en/news/feature/2010/07/16/foreign-direct-investment-china-story (recognizing the 
PRC’s success in mobilizing FDI and achieving economic development and export 
success). 
26. See, e.g., Zhaodong Jiang, China’s Tax Preferences to Foreign Investment: Policy, 
Culture and Modern Concepts, 18 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 549, 550–59 (1998) (outlining a 
brief overview of China’s tax preferences for FDI starting in the late 1970s); Associated 
Press, China Opens Shanghai Free-Trade Zone, GUARDIAN (London) (Sept. 29, 2013, 7:40 
AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/29/china-shanghai-free-trade-
zone (reporting that the newly established free-trade zone in Shanghai has been billed 
by the PRC government as a major step for financial reforms and economic 
experimentation). 
27. Shen Wei, Dark Past, Grey Present or Bright Future?—Foreign Investors’ Access to 
China’s Telecommunications Industry and a Political Economy Analysis of Recent Industrial 
Policy Moves, J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 513, 514–15 (2012) (“The entire 1990s witnessed 
differential liberalization dominance as well as a departure from the conventional state 
planning system of the old days to a more market-oriented macro-economic regulation 
and control.”); see ZHANG ET AL., supra note 17, at 3 (“In 1990s, China has absorbed 
about half of the FDI inflows into all developing countries.”). 
28. See Shen, supra note 27, at 519 (arguing that the PRC’s joining the WTO 
ushered further liberalization and modernization of its economy); ZHANG ET AL., supra 
note 17, at 9 (timeline of key developments from 1978 to 2001). 
29 . See, e.g., Schindelheim, supra note 4, at 198 (characterizing the PRC 
government’s current attitude toward foreign investments as “cautious and 
protectionist”); Edward M. Graham & Erika Wada, Foreign Direct Investment in China: 
Effects on Growth and Economic Performance (Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 01-
03, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=300884 
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has persisted partly in the form of regulatory restrictions of non-
PRC investments in a variety of industries. 30  The disparate 
treatment of PRC and non-PRC investments has been a 
longstanding policy of the CCP and is expected to persist in the 
foreseeable future.31 Further, some believe that the CCP may be 
contemplating a return to a more protectionist regime—fueled 
by growing nationalist pride and a push to keep homegrown 
companies under the PRC’s control.32 
Since its promulgation in 1995, the Catalogue for the 
Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries (the “Catalogue”) 
has served as the centerpiece of the CCP’s FDI policy.33 The 
current version of the Catalogue expressly assigns over four 
                                                                                                                            
(observing the deceleration in FDI inflow in the late 1990s and the sentiment among 
overseas investors of discouragement and determent by the perceived unfavorable FDI 
environment). 
30. See Shen Wei, Will the Door Open Wider in the Aftermath of Alibaba? —Placing (or 
Misplacing) Foreign Investment in a Chinese Public Law Frame, 42 H.K.L.J. (PT. 2) 561, 561 
(2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2320402 
(“Recent years witnessed a rising chorus of complaints from the foreign business 
community concerning China’s protectionist regulatory environment and increasing 
hostility to foreign multinationals.”); John Lee, China’s FDI Obstacle Course, BUS. 
SPECTATOR (Sept. 18, 2013, 7:37 AM), http://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/
2013/9/18/economy/chinas-fdi-obstacle-course (describing the foreign investment 
approval process as “labyrinthine”); OECD, FDI REGULATORY RESTRICTIVENESS INDEX 
(2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm (ranking China as 
the number one most restrictive of all OECD and G20 countries with respect to FDI). 
31. See Hui Huang, The Regulation of Foreign Investment in Post-WTO China: a 
Political Economy Analysis, 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 185, 185 (2009) (suggesting that the 
dual system of the general company law and the specific laws for foreign investment 
enterprises is likely to persist in the foreseeable future); DANIEL M. PRICE & MICHAEL J. 
SMART, PAULSON INSTITUTE, BIT BY BIT—A PATH TO STRENGTHEN US-CHINA 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS (July 2013), http://www.paulsoninstitute.org/media/102532/
bit_by_bit_pricesmart_english_final.pdf (illustrating the incompatibility between the 
US requirement of providing equal market access to domestic and non-domestic 
capital and China’s FDI restrictions in the context of the ongoing US-China bilateral 
investment treaty negotiation). 
32. See Simon Luk, Certain Recent Entrepreneurial Responses to China’s Mergers & 
Acquisitions Rules, SIMON LUK’S ARTICLES BLOG, http://simonlukarticles.blogspot.com/
2009/05/certain-recent-entrepreneurial.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2013) (“The 
Chinese government may impose tighter control over M&A activities involving Chinese 
entrepreneurs in order to preserve stability in both its foreign exchange policy and 
national capital account.”); Bath, supra note 15, at 32 (observing the pressure from 
“popular resistance to foreign takeover of well-regarded Chinese companies”). 
33. See Shen, supra note 27, at 516 (“The Catalogue signaled the state policies in 
attracting foreign investment.”); Li Wanqiang, Chinese Foreign Investment Laws: A Review 
from the Perspective of Policy-oriented Jurisprudence, 19 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 35, 37 (2011) 
(indicating the central importance of the industry-based FDI guidance catalogue). 
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hundred industry sectors into three categories, designating non-
PRC investments as either “encouraged,” “restricted,” or 
“prohibited,” respectively.34 Non-PRC investments in sectors not 
specifically listed in the Catalogue are considered “permitted.”35 
Those investments placed in a “restricted” category require 
government approval, which usually involves a complex and 
opaque process.36 Finally, those in the “prohibited” category are 
technically forbidden under PRC law.37 Notably, the Internet 
and value-added telecommunications services sectors, where the 
VIE structure is prevalently used, are categorized as 
“prohibited,” disallowing non-PRC ownership.38 
                                                                                                                            
34. See Waishang Touzi Chanye Zhidao Mulu (外商投资产业指导目录) [Catalogue 
for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries] (promulgated by the Nat’l Dev. & 
Reform Comm’n, and the Ministry of Com. (“MOFCOM”), Dec. 24, 2011, effective Jan. 
30, 2012) (China); Jane Bu et al., China’s New Foreign Investment Catalogue Comes into 
Effect, MORRISON FOERSTER 1 (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/
Images/120130-Foreign-Investment-Catalogue.pdf (“‘Encouraged,’ ‘restricted[,]’ and 
‘prohibited’ projects are expressly enumerated in the Catalogue.”). 
35. See Jane Bu et al., supra note 34, at 1 (“Projects that are not specified in the 
Catalogue fall under the ‘permitted’ category by default.”); J. Gray Sasser, China Risk 
Factor Hiding in Plain View: A Brief Analysis of Variable Interest Entities (VIEs) Under Chinese 
Law, TENN. CORP. NEWSL. (Nov. 2012), available at http://www.frostbrowntodd.com/
resources-1527.html (“Investments in industries not specifically listed in the Catalogue 
is considered ‘permitted’ . . . .”). 
36. See Bath, supra note 15, at 11 (“Despite the substantial amount of material 
issued by the government in the form of regulations, policies and guidelines, the 
approval process is still to a large extent non-transparent.”); China Revises Foreign 
Investment Guidance Catalogue, CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA (Apr. 10, 2012), 
http://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/china-revises-foreign-
investment-guidance-catalogue (calling the approval process discretionary and non-
transparent, and providing the PRC government the opportunity to “retaliate against 
foreign investors which have raised the ire of authorities”). 
37. See CHUNLAI CHEN, The Evolution and Main Features of China’s FDI Laws and 
Policies, in FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA: LOCATION DETERMINANTS, INVESTOR 
DIFFERENCES AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS 33, 60 (2011) (“Foreign direct investment in 
prohibited industries by any foreign investors is not allowed at all.”); China Business 
Center—Encouraged, Permitted, Restricted and Prohibited Industries, LEHMAN BROWN 
http://www.lehmanbrowncpa.com/en/resources/class_view.asp?id=509 (last visited on 
Jan. 28, 2014) (“Investment in ‘prohibited’ industries is completely off limits to foreign 
investment.”). 
38. See Steve Dickinson, VIEs in China. The End of a Flawed Strategy., CHINA L. BLOG 
(Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2011/10/vies_in_china_the_end_of_
a_flawed_strategy.html (stating that direct foreign ownership in the internet sector is 
prohibited); Greg Pilarowski, Tudou IPO Exposes Yet Another China Risk Factor: The 
Founder’s Wife, VENTURE BEAT (Aug. 19, 2011), http://venturebeat.com/2011/08/19/
tudou-ipo-exposes-yet-another-china-risk-factor-the-founder%E2%80%99s-wife (noting 
that all US-listed Chinese internet companies use a VIE structure). 
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B. From China-China-Foreign to Variable Interest Entity: The Rise of 
Variable Interest Entity as the New Workaround 
As the Chinese saying goes, “The law is strong, but the 
outlaws are ten times stronger.” 39  In 1994, China United 
Network Communications Group Co., Ltd. (“China Unicom”), a 
state-owned telecommunications operator, invented and utilized 
what is referred to as the China-China-Foreign (“CCF”) 
structure to circumvent FDI prohibitions in the sector.40 CCF 
allowed non-PRC investors to gain equity-like benefits via a joint 
venture arrangement without outright violation of the PRC’s 
investment prohibition.41  Within three years, China Unicom 
raised at least US$1.4 billion, or seventy-two percent of its total 
funding, through the CCF structure. 42 
Unexpectedly, in October 1998, the PRC government 
issued a report declaring the CCF structure “irregular” and 
                                                                                                                            
39. 道高一尺，魔高一丈; see also Wu Zhong, Dark Days for China’s Whistleblowers, 
ASIA TIMES (Mar. 26, 2009), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KC26Ad01.html 
(referencing the proverb). 
40. See CADWALADER, Understanding the VIE Structure, supra note 6, at 3 (“China 
Unicom attempted to use the China-China-Foreign structure . . . in 1994 to directly 
circumvent the Ministry of Information Industry’s . . . prohibition of FDI in the telecom 
services sector.”); China Legal Developments Bulletin, BAKER & MCKENZIE 9 (Jul.-Sept. 
2009), http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Supporting%20
Your%20Business/Recommended%20Reading/nl_china_legaldevelopmentsbulletin_
julsep09.pdf (explaining that the structure is called China-China-Foreign, because it 
typically involves a Chinese operating company, a Chinese company with the 
appropriate license, either a wholly owned foreign subsidiary or a joint venture 
between a Chinese and a foreign company, and a foreign parent company. The foreign 
company or subsidiary supplies the capital and technology required by the local 
company); Shen, supra note 27, at 517 (“In the 1990s, foreign investors made great 
efforts to sneak around the law restricting the involvement of foreign investment in the 
telecoms industry. . . . China Unicom was the first Chinese entity that used the CCF 
structure.”). 
41. See Scott Yunxiang Guan, China’s Telecommunications Reforms: From Monopoly 
Towards Competition, Part 2, 9 ASIAN ECON. & POL. ISSUES 11 (2003) (explaining the 
complex three-way management contracts between the PRC operator, the joint venture 
entity, and the non-PRC investor); INFORMATION GATEKEEPERS INC., CHINATELECOM 
2000 V.6: NEW TELECOM POLICY AND STRUCTURE AFTER REORGANIZATION 58, exhibit 
2.5 (1999) (demonstrating graphically the CCF joint venture structure). 
42. IGI CONSULTING INC., supra note 41, at 57; see Shen, supra note 27, at 517 
(“From 1995 to 1999, China Unicom executed around 46 cooperative projects in the 
form of CCF structure, including projects with French Telecom and Japan’s NTT, and 
involved planned investments totaling US$1.5 billion and actual investments of US$1 
billion.”). 
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called for its ban.43 A dramatic disintegration of the structure 
ensued.44  Although CCF had been utilized by a few dozen 
telecom businesses for several years without official intervention, 
the report made clear that the CCF was nevertheless 
unacceptable under the PRC law.45 Many non-PRC investors who 
had previously interpreted the CCP’s administrative silence as its 
tacit approval of the investment structure were surprised by this 
sudden move.46 As a result, some of the CCF investors incurred 
considerable losses on their investment pursuant to the 
prohibition of the structure.47 
For many PRC companies and non-PRC investors, however, 
the CCF experience did not stop them from looking for other 
regulatory loopholes and engineering new ways to circumvent 
                                                                                                                            
43. China VIE Structure for Foreign Investment Under Attack from Multiple Directions: 
Will It Emerge (Relatively) Unscathed or Is Its Very Survival Threatened?, HOGAN LOVELLS 
(Jan. 2012), http://www.hoganlovells.com/newsmedia/pubDetail.aspx?publication=
7669; Ian Macintosh, Regulating the New Economy: Implications of WTO Accession for 
Telecommunications and E-Commerce in China, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING 
SYSTEM: ENTERING THE NEW MILLENNIUM 263, 266 (Deborah Z. Cass et al. eds., 2003) 
(“[I]n October 1999, the MII announced that the CCF project contracts were 
‘irregular’ under state policy and regulation.”). 
44. See Robert Lewis, Investors at the Gate, 26 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 36, 36 (2007) 
(noting the “spectacular and well-publicized demise” of the CCF structure); Leontine 
D. Chuang, Comment, Investing in China’s Telecommunications Market: Reflections on the 
Rule of Laws and Foreign Investment in China, 20 NW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 509, 510 (1999) 
(calling the birth, development, and demise of the CCF structure an ill-fated and a 
perfect example of the lack of clarity in the PRC’s investment law). 
45. See Philip Sohmen, Taming the Dragon: China’s Efforts to Regulate the Internet, 1 
STAN. J. E. ASIAN AFF. 17, 23 (2001), available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/
journal1/china1.pdf (“[The CCF structure] had been sanctioned at the highest level, 
but in 1998 the MII announced suddenly that such investment was in fact illegal, as it 
was equivalent to equity ownership.”); CADWALADER, Understanding the VIE Structure 
supra note 6, at 3 (explaining that CCF was unacceptable “because FDI in the basic 
telecom service sector . . . was, and remain[ed], prohibited”). 
46. See  Yuka Kobayashi, The Impact of the World Trade Organization on China’s Trade 
Policy, in CHINA’S FOREIGN TRADE POLICY: THE NEW CONSTITUENCIES 143, 157 (Ka 
Zeng ed., 2007) (noting that the PRC authority changed its attitude from turning a 
blind eye to tightening control); IGI CONSULTING INC., supra note 41, at 57 (“[M]any 
foreign companies are surprised by the Chinese government’s sudden move.”). 
47. See Kobayashi, supra note 46, at 157 (indicating that the total loss suffered by 
non-PRC investors in the CCF aftermath was likely substantial); Lynnette Luna, CCF 
Investors in China May Not Go Quietly, RCR WIRELESS (Aug. 23, 1999), http://
www.rcrwireless.com/article/19990823/sub/ccf-investors-in-china-may-not-go-quietly 
(“‘You won’t find very many happy investors. . . . They are going through turmoil and 
uncertainty. They have to negotiate a way out of these deals.’”(quoting Hui Pan, chief 
economist with IGI Consulting in Boston)). 
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FDI restrictions.48 Soon after the CCF structure was invalidated, 
the Sina Corporation, a major Chinese Internet company, 
pioneered the VIE structure with its initial public offering 
(“IPO”) on the NASDAQ.49 In contrast with CCF’s equity-based 
joint venture arrangement, the VIE structure simulates the 
effects of ownership exclusively by contracts, without acquiring 
an actual equity interest in the PRC business.50 
The VIE structure, in its most basic format, involves three 
entities: a US exchange-listed entity domiciled in an offshore 
financial center, typically the Cayman Islands (“ListCo”), a 
Wholly Foreign-Owned Entity domiciled in PRC (“WFOE”), and 
a company with operating business domiciled in the PRC 
(“OpCo”).51 US investors purchase equity in the ListCo, which 
owns one hundred percent of the WFOE. 52  To establish a 
connection between the ListCo and the OpCo, the WFOE 
typically executes five essential contracts with the OpCo and its 
PRC owners.53 These contracts include: (1) a loan agreement, 
                                                                                                                            
48. See China VIE Structure, supra note 43, at 1 (noting that after the CCF structure 
was declared “irregular,” other workarounds have “since re-emerged in various forms 
and guises”); Q+A-Variable Interest Entities in China, REUTERS (Sept. 23, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USL3E7KJ1AU20110923 (describing the VIE 
as “a structure lawyers devised to permit foreign investors to get around Chinese rules 
barring foreigners from owning certain domestic enterprises”). 
49. See Gillis, supra note 8, at 3 (noting the emergence of the VIE structure in 
2000); Barboza, supra note 10 (citing Sina as the first one to use the VIE structure). 
50. See Paul Gillis, Explaining VIE Structures, CHINA ACCT. BLOG (Mar. 20, 2011), 
http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/explaining-vie-structures.html (“The 
concept that underpins a VIE structure is that control is obtained through legal 
agreements rather than through share ownership.”); Lawrence, supra note 6 (stating 
that VIE allows non-PRC investors to set up agreements to mimic equity ownership). 
51. See David Roberts & Thomas Hall, O’Melveny & Myers Publishes Paper on VIE 
Structures in China: What You Need to Know, O’MELVENY & MYERS 1–3 (Oct. 2011), 
http://www.omm.com/files/Uploads/Documents/VIE%20Structures%20in%
20China%20-%20What%20You%20Need%20to%20Know.pdf (analyzing the 
components of a basic VIE structure); CADWALADER, Understanding the VIE Structure, 
supra note 6, at 1–3 (examining the typical VIE structure). 
52. See CADWALADER, Understanding the VIE Structure, supra note 6, at 2 (noting 
that the offshore ListCo owns or controls the onshore WFOE); Roberts & Hall, supra 
note 51, at 1 (describing the step where the offshore holding company forms a wholly-
owned subsidiary in the PRC). 
53. See Roberts & Hall, supra note 51 (listing call option agreement, equity pledge 
agreement, voting rights agreement, loan agreement, exclusive service agreement and 
asset licensing agreement as common agreements comprising a VIE arrangement); 
China VIE Structure, supra note 43 (identifying cooperation agreement, voting proxy, 
equity pledge agreement and option agreement as contractual instruments of control). 
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which capitalizes the OpCo by channeling the ListCo’s funds 
through the WFOE; (2) an equity pledge agreement, where the 
PRC owners of the OpCo pledge their equity to the WFOE as a 
guarantee of their performance; (3) an options agreement, 
which allows the WFOE to purchase the PRC owners’ equity in 
the OpCo at the lowest permissible price under the PRC law; (4) 
a proxy agreement, in which the OpCo’s owners delegate their 
shareholder rights to the WFOE’s designee; and (5) a consulting 
or technical service agreement, which appropriates all of the 
OpCo’s profits to the WFOE.54 This web of contracts comprises 
the VIE structure and allows the ListCo to consolidate the 
income and assets of the PRC-domiciled OpCo in its financial 
statements under the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
of the United States (“US GAAP”).55 
The internet industry was the first to adopt the VIE 
structure, with other industries quickly following suit.56 Today, 
there are more than one hundred PRC-domiciled businesses 
listed and traded in the United States through the use of VIE 
structures, including most of the crown jewels of the PRC’s 
Internet industry, such as Sina, Baidu, Sohu, and Tudou.57 Like 
                                                                                                                            
54. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the common 
contracts comprising of a basic VIE structure). 
55 . See FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 46(R): 
CONSOLIDATION OF VARIABLE INTEREST ENTITIES (2003), available at http://
www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobnocache=true&blobwhere=11758
20923530&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobheadername2=Content-Length
&blobheadername1=Content-Disposition&blobheadervalue2=540473&blob
headervalue1=filename%3Daop_FIN46R.pdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs 
(interpreting the primary beneficiary test for the recognition and consolidation of VIEs 
under the US GAAP accounting standard); see also Paul Gillis, The Emperor’s New Suit: 
VIEs in China, CHINA ACCT. BLOG (Mar. 9, 2011), http://
www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/the-emperors-new-suit-vies-.html (observing 
that the “anti-Enron” accounting rule FIN 46(R) creates unintended loopholes for 
PRC-domiciled VIEs). 
56. See Variable Interest Entities in China, supra note 48 at 2 (“The VIE structure was 
first used in the Internet sector . . . and has since spread to other industries.”); see also 
Heightened Scrutiny to VIE Structures under the New M&A Rules, BLANK ROME (Nov. 2011), 
http://www.blankrome.com/index.cfm?contentID=37&itemID=2632 (“The use of VIE 
structure has been widespread.”). 
57. See Joy Shaw et al., China VIE Structure May Hold Hidden Risks, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 
11, 2011, 12:27 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/0a1e4d78-0bf6-11e1-9310-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2giY4RPml (“Most of China’s well established internet 
companies – Sina (NASDAQ: SINA), Baidu.com (NASDAQ: BIDU), Tudou (NASDAQ: 
SOHU) among them – are listed in the US using this structure.”); see also Dickinson, 
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its CCF predecessor, VIE has grown more common over the 
years, presumably as lawyers, bankers, and investors have 
become increasingly comfortable with the assumption that PRC 
regulators have tacitly approved VIEs by virtue of their 
continued non-action.58 
Several factors contribute to the popularity of the VIE 
structure.59 From the PRC companies’ perspective, the structure 
enables them to access the funding that may otherwise be 
difficult or impossible to obtain in domestic capital markets.60 
The structure also proffers a shortcut to overseas investment by 
eliminating the need to obtain central government approval of 
cross-border acquisition of Chinese assets and equity.61 Another 
consideration is the reputational boost a PRC company receives 
from the prestige of being listed on a US exchange.62 From the 
                                                                                                                            
supra note 38, at 1 (noting that “virtually the entire Internet sector” was funded by 
foreign IPOs). 
58. See, e.g., CADWALADER, Understanding the VIE Structure, supra note 6, at 3 
(suggesting the widespread acceptance that the Sina/VIE model assumes the tacit 
approval of the PRC regulators); see also Neil Gough, In China, Concern About a Chill on 
Foreign Investments, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 2, 2013, 2:15 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/06/02/in-china-concern-of-a-chill-on-foreign-investments/?_php=true&_type=
blogs&_r=0 (musing that the general presumption of tacit approval may be based on 
the justification that “such investment could help build corporate champions and 
create jobs”). 
59. See, e.g., Barboza, supra note 10, at 2 (“Private companies often chose this 
route because they had difficulty raising capital in China, where state-run banks tend to 
favor government-owned companies.”); Clare Baldwin, IPO VIEW-China Web IPO flow to 
US Threatened by Crackdown, REUTERS (Sept. 23, 2011, 5:08 PM), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/23/markets-stocks-ipos-idUSS1E78M1VA20110923 
(“The VIE structure, which has been effective in circumventing foreign investment 
rules, would not be that easy to replace. . . . So far, investors have been willing to pay 
rich valuations and put up with VIEs because they have been desperate to tap into 
Chinese Internet growth.”); supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing the 
popular position taken by VIE underwriters and deal lawyers). 
60. See Barboza, supra note 10; Csordas, supra note 27, at 382–83 (noting that 
companies sometimes resort to loansharking as an alternative financing method). 
61. See Guanyu Waiguo Touzizhe Binggou Jingnei Qiyede Guiding (关于外国投资
者并购境内企业的规定) [Provisions on Mergers & Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises 
by Foreign Investors (also known as “Circular 10”)], (promulgated Aug. 8, 2006, 
effective Sept. 8, 2006) (China) (requiring approvals from MOFCOM and the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission of cross-border acquisitions of Chinese assets and 
equity, regardless of industry sector); Heightened Scrutiny to VIE Structures under the New 
M&A Rules, supra note 56 (“[The] VIE structure [has] been used by PRC nationals to 
engage in international financing for their businesses to circumvent Circular 10.”). 
62. See Telis Demos et al., US Door Swings Ajar to China IPOs, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 
2013, 8:32 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732442390457
8523463905850332 (“A US listing can help up-and-coming Chinese companies boost 
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CCP’s perspective, the substantial economic benefit derived 
from the cross-border inflow of capital through VIEs incentivizes 
the CCP to leave this issue in a “legal gray area” for the time 
being.63 In the US capital markets, both institutional and retail 
investors are zealous about high-growth investment projects in 
the PRC.64 Absent a better alternative to invest in the PRC’s 
prohibited sectors, VIE has remained their investment structure 
of choice.65 
C. Recent Legislation, Regulation, and Treaty Negotiation by the 
People’s Republic of China Affecting Variable Interest Entities 
In February 2011, the State Council, the PRC’s highest 
administrative organ, published the Circular by the General 
                                                                                                                            
their visibility in the US and enhance their prestige at home.”); see also Matthias von 
Oppen & Joseph Marx, Limited to 300, 27 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 32, 32 (2008) (suggesting 
that overseas listings provide PRC businesses with domestic prestige). 
63. Aubin, supra note 13 (“By leaving the issue in a legal gray area, China can 
attract foreign investment to bolster key sectors of the economy, while keeping the 
right to clamp down when it desires.”); see Ken Davies, China Investment Policy: An 
Update 7 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., Working Papers on International 
Investment, Jan. 2013), available at http://www.oecd.org/china/WP-2013_1.pdf 
(“China remains the largest recipient of FDI among developing countries and FDI 
continues to play a disproportionately large role in promoting China’s trade, 
investment and tax revenue generation . . .”); see also Chris Leahy & Max Hirsch,  
Variable Interest Entities: Risks and Rewards, BLACKPEAK, http://blackpeak.ehclients.
com/images/uploads/news/VIEs_in_China.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2012) (noting 
that the VIE structure enables “valuable access to foreign investments and capital 
markets”). 
64. See Shai Oster & Dune Lawrence, Baidu Forced to Add Warnings as Regulators 
Focus on China Stocks, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 15, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2013-12-15/baidu-forced-to-add-warnings-as-regulators-focus-on-china-stocks.html 
(“‘On the one hand the structure is obviously risky, but on the other hand the best-
performing stocks in the world this year have been the Chinese Internet stocks, all of 
which are VIEs. . . . So if you invest in them you take on more risk than you’d like, but if 
you don’t invest in them your returns will fall well short of your benchmark. Plus, 
investors are looking for ways to play the ‘rising Chinese consumer,’ and Internet stocks 
are really the only way to do it.’” (quoting Arthur Kroeber, Beijing-based managing 
director of GaveKal Dragonomics)); see also Matthew Mosk et al., US Officials: China 
Refuses to Help Stop Investment Scams, ABC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/
Blotter/us-investors-lose-billions-alleged-chinese-stock-schemes/story?id=18164787 
(assessing that accounting frauds involving Chinese stocks have been fueled by “a burst 
of interest among US investors in putting money behind the Chinese industrial 
boom”). 
65. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; Heightened Scrutiny to VIE Structures 
under the New M&A Rules, supra note 56 (noting that VIE has been an investment 
structure of choice for non-PRC investors to navigate the grey areas of PRC FDI law). 
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Office of the State Council regarding Institution of the Security 
Review System for Merger and Acquisition of Domestic 
Enterprises by Foreign Investors (the “Security Review Circular” 
or the “Circular”).66 The Security Review Circular specifically 
requires government review of those mergers and acquisitions 
affecting “key technologies” that are susceptible to the “actual 
control” of a non-PRC investor.67 Actual control exists when a 
non-PRC investor becomes either the controlling shareholder or 
the actual controller of a domestic enterprise through a 
corporate transaction. 68  Specifically, the Circular emphasizes 
that a proposed transaction that transfers the actual control of a 
PRC enterprise’s operational or financial decision-making to a 
non-PRC investor, is subject to security review.69 
                                                                                                                            
66. See China VIE Structure, supra note 44 (discussing the Security Review Circular 
in the context of recent legislative attacks on the VIE); see also The People’s Republic 
Strikes Back? China Issues National Security Review Regulations for Foreign-Funded M&A, 
GREENBERG TRAURIG (Feb. 2011), http://www.gtlaw.com/News-Events/Publications/
Alerts?find=148219 (“Nearly five years after issuing the first rules on the subject, and 
following several years of merger control business concentration filings, on February 3, 
2011 the PRC State Council promulgated [the Circular].”). 
67. Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Jianli Waiguo Touzizhe Binggou Jingnei 
Qiye Anquan Shencha Zhidude Tongzhi (国务院办公厅关于建立外国投资者并购境内
企业安全审查制度的通知) [Circular of the General Office of the State Council on the 
Establishment of Security Review System Regarding Merger and Acquisition of 
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors] (promulgated by the Gen. Office State 
Council, Feb. 3, 2011, effective Mar. 3, 2011) (China) (“The scope of security review of 
mergers and acquisitions is the mergers and acquisitions by foreign investors of . . . 
units concerning national security; and such domestic enterprises as . . . key 
technologies . . . whose actual control right may be gained by foreign investors.”) 
(unofficial translation); see New Review System for Foreign Investor M&A Deals with 
Domestic Enterprises, SQUIRE SANDERS (Feb. 2011), http://www.squiresanders.com/new_
review_system_for_foreign_investor_m&a_deals_with_domestic_enterprises (stating 
that the definition of “actual control” under the Circular is extensive, which includes 
de facto control despite actual equity stake). 
68. See Laney Zhang, China: Security Review Rules on Foreign Mergers and Acquisitions 
Published, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/
servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205402543_text (discussing the “actual control” test); see also 
Wang Xing, Review of Foreign Takeovers Won’t Hurt Investment, CHINA DAILY (Feb. 17, 
2011, 8:01 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-02/17/content_12029
238.htm (noting confirmation by the National Development and Reform Commission 
that minority ownership would not trigger security review). 
69. See New Review System for Foreign Investor M&A Deals with Domestic Enterprises, 
supra note 67; see also Zhang, supra note 68 (“Acquisition of actual control applies to . . . 
any other circumstance under which the actual control of a domestic enterprise’s 
operational decisions, financial, personnel, and/or technology is transferred to foreign 
investors.”). 
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In September 2011, the PRC’s Ministry of Commerce 
(“MOFCOM”), an executive agency of the State Council, 
promulgated Announcement No. 53 pursuant to the Security 
Review Circular (“M&A Rule”).70 Of particular relevance to VIE 
structures, Article 9 of the M&A Rule reads: 
With regard to the merger and acquisition of domestic 
enterprises undertaken by foreign investors, the authorities 
should judge whether such transaction is subject to the 
security review based on the essential content and actual impact 
of the transaction. Foreign investors shall not avoid M&A 
security review through any means, including but not 
limited to commissioned shareholdings, trusts, multi-level 
investments, leases, loans, contractual control, and overseas 
transactions.71 
Arguably, to examine a VIE’s “actual impact” would reveal 
that the structure is contingent upon US investors’ obtaining 
“actual control” of the PRC business by engaging in “overseas 
transactions” and exercising “contractual control.”72 Thus, the 
M&A Rule may be understood as a clear indication by the CCP 
that the VIE structure is designed to avoid the PRC’s regulatory 
scrutiny, and that VIE investors may bear adverse consequences 
                                                                                                                            
70. See Zhang, supra note 68; Shen, supra note 27, at 533–34 (discussing the M&A 
Rules and calling it “the most influential piece of legislation which had an immediate 
and widespread effect on the VIE structure”). 
71. Shangwubu Shishi Waiguo Touzizhe Binggou Jingnei Qiye Anquan Shengcha 
Zhidude Guiding (商务部实施外国投资者并购境内企业安全审查制度的规定 ) 
[Announcement No. 53 of 2011 of MOFCOM Concerning the Provisions of the 
MOFCOM for the Implementation of the Security Review System for M&A of Domestic 
Enterprises by Foreign Investors] (promulgated by the Min. of Com., Aug. 25, 2011, 
effective Sept. 1, 2011) (China) (emphasis added); see also David Yu et al., MOFCOM 
Issues the Official Implementation Provisions on the Security Review Regarding Mergers and 
Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, LLINKS L. OFFICES (Sept. 2011), 
http://www.llinkslaw.com/shangchuan/201199130644.pdf (analyzing the “substance 
over form” concept in Section 9). 
72. See Gough, supra note 58 (“While variable interest entities in such cases are 
technically owned by the Chinese, foreign-owned corporations maintain de facto 
control through a series of contracts that can involve equity pledges, profit 
assignments, purchase options and service or consulting agreements.”); see also Russell 
Flannery, Is It The Twilight Of An Era For Chinese Listings In The US?, FORBES (Oct. 12, 
2012, 11:04 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/russellflannery/2012/10/12/is-it-the-
twilight-of-an-era-for-chinese-listings-in-the-u-s (“[T]he VIE structure, or variable 
interest entity, allows foreign investors to achieve de facto control of a Chinese 
operating business without direct equity ownership . . . accomplished by a web of 
contracts.”). 
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for engaging in plainly prohibited investment activities. 73 
Accordingly, many experts question how much longer VIE 
structures can survive under these new regulations, a critical part 
of which appear to target this particular investment structure.74 
The manipulability of the Rules’ loose language, the 
centralization of the review and approval process, and the lack 
of clarity as to the ultimate decision-making authority create 
additional uncertainties to the already precarious legal status of 
VIE structures. 75  Nevertheless, some experts remain 
unconvinced that the M&A Rules resolve the ambiguity 
definitively.76 
One other recent development that could shape the future 
of VIEs is the resumed negotiation of a bilateral investment 
                                                                                                                            
73 . See Malcolm Riddell, VIEs: How Foreigners Invest In China’s ‘Prohibited’ 
Industries–And The New Risks, CHINA DEBATE (Jan. 26, 2012), http://
www.chinadebate.com/2012/01/vies-how-foreigners-invest-in-chinas-prohibited-
industries-and-the-new-risks (noting that the VIE structure has helped big Internet 
companies in China to raise “billions of dollars by effectively skirting Chinese 
regulations that ban foreign investors from acquiring stakes in companies operating in 
restricted industries”); Gough, supra note 58 (arguing that VIE takes advantage of 
regulatory loopholes). 
74. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 38 (“[I]t is now clear that the contractual 
arrangements on which the various VIEs are based are in clear violation of Chinese law. 
This renders the contracts unenforceable and makes existing VIE structures essentially 
meaningless.”); see also Kathrin Hille, Foreign Internet Presence in China to Face Scrutiny, 
FIN. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2011, 5:23 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/7f8645e2-d493-
11e0-a42b-00144feab49a.html#axzz1Wb8B6ceg (“[T]he new rules no longer allowed 
the past assumption of Beijing’s ‘tacit approval’ of such vehicles.”). 
75. See, e.g., Hille, supra note 74 (noting that the vague wording of the rules could 
give regulators greater discretionary powers); Bath, supra note 15 (“The addition of the 
security review process, which has the potential to reverse the process whereby the 
ability to approve projects has been consistently delegated to the lower levels of 
government, is a particularly unconstructive addition to the regulatory process, as it 
adds time, complexity, and lack of transparency.”); Shaw et al., supra note 57 (citing an 
unnamed MOFCOM source cautioning that “the lack of consensus on VIE partly 
reflects ongoing power struggles among various regulatory agencies, which all seek to 
expand regulatory authority”). 
76. See New PRC Rules Establish National Security Review For M&A Transactions 
Involving Non-Chinese Investors, KAUFMAN & CANOLES, http://
www.kaufmanandcanoles.com/news/articles/new_prc_rules_establish_national_
security_review_for_m%26a_transactions_involving_non-chinese_investors.htm (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2014) (contending that the language of the M&A Rule is too ambiguous 
for one to determine whether the VIE falls within its regulatory scope); Dickinson, 
supra note 38 (“Many foreign investors contend that existing VIE structures are sound 
and that VIE arrangements can safely be used in the future.”). 
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treaty between the United States and the PRC.77  This is a 
promising sign, indicating that the PRC might soon open more 
sectors to equity investments from the United States. 78  A 
successfully negotiated treaty could entirely eliminate the need 
for the VIE structure and its associated investment 
uncertainties.79 Having said that, it is too early to tell whether 
and when such a treaty will come to fruition.80 Moreover, even if 
the two governments eventually reach an agreement, any 
opening of the restricted sectors will likely occur gradually over 
time.81  
                                                                                                                            
77. See, e.g., Betsy Bourassa, U.S. and China Breakthrough Announcement on the 
Bilateral Investment Treaty Negotiations, U.S DEPT. TREASURY (July 15, 2013), http://
www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/U.S.-and-China-Breakthrough-Announcement-
.aspx; see also Annie Lowrey, U.S. and China to Discuss Investment Treaty, but Cybersecurity 
Is a Concern, N. Y. TIMES, July 11, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/12/world/
asia/us-and-china-to-discuss-investment-treaty-but-cybersecurity-is-a-concern.html?_r=0 
(noting that the BIT may potentially open a vast number of sectors to investments from 
the other side). 
78. See Bourassa, supra note 77 (“This [negotiation] marks an important step in 
opening China’s economy to U.S. investment by eliminating market barriers, and 
leveling the playing field for American workers and businesses.”); He Wei, US-China 
Trade Talks a “Turning Point” in Relations, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 24, 2013), http://
usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-10/24/content_17054413.htm (suggesting that 
the BIT talk may be the most important trade negotiation since the WTO talks). 
79 . See Bourassa, supra note 77 (noting that the current negotiation effort 
“represents the first time that China has agreed to negotiate a BIT that includes all 
stages of investment and sectors”); Ian Talley & William Mauldin, U.S., China to Pursue 
Investment Treaty, WALL ST. J. (July 11, 2013, 8:06 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424127887324425204578599913527965812 (suggesting that a deal 
“could open up more than 100 Chinese industries to investment by US businesses”). 
80. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 19, at 21 (arguing that the prospects of a Sino-
United States BIT are “rather bleak,” partly because it is doubtful that China would 
agree to the US demand of market access, and partly because of the growing 
protectionism pressure in the US); Simon Denyer, Amid Attacks by Chinese Government 
and Media, Foreign Companies Get Mixed Signals, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2013, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/amid-attacks-by-chinese-government-and-
media-foreign-companies-receive-mixed-signals/2013/08/09/b02eea48-00d6-11e3-
8294-0ee5075b840d_story.html (expecting the negotiations to be “long and tortuous”). 
81. Compare Lester Ross et al., Prospects for Further Market Access and Protections in 
China: US-China Bilateral Investment Treaty Developments, WILMERHALE (Oct. 4, 2013), 
http://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=
10737422352 (emphasizing the significance of the PRC’s willingness to adopt a 
“negative list” approach, which should afford non-discrimination and other protections 
of BIT to all sectors, absent negotiated exceptions), with Yu Ran, FTZ’s “Negative List” 
Policy to Be Modified, CHINA DAILY (Nov. 16, 2013, 9:42 AM), http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/shanghaifreetradezone/2013-11/16/content_
17109879.htm (reporting that the “negative list” approach currently tested in the 
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D. Role of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission in 
Regulating Variable Interest Entities Listed in the United States 
All publicly-held companies in the United States, including 
VIEs, are subject to the regulation of the SEC.82 The SEC was 
created in wake of the Great Depression by the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.83 Its core mission is “to protect investors,” 
“maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets,” and “facilitate 
capital formation.”84 One of the SEC’s primary responsibilities is 
to oversee and improve the quality of corporate disclosure to 
help the investing public make informed investment decisions.85 
Public companies are required to disclose all material 
information in periodic filings with the SEC, and may be subject 
to securities liabilities for material misrepresentation or 
omission.86 Information is considered material if there is “a 
                                                                                                                            
Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone is expected to be rolled out at a slow and conservative 
pace). 
82 . See US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), DELOITTE, http://
www.iasplus.com/en/resources/regional/sec (last visited Feb. 26, 2014) (“In the 
United States, the public capital markets are regulated primarily by the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), a national government agency.”). See generally The 
Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates 
Capital Formation’ U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.
shtml#intro (last visited Feb. 26, 2014) [hereinafter The Investor’s Advocate] 
(emphasizing the requirement for public companies to file periodic reports with the 
SEC, which ensures that the investing public have equal and timely access to important 
corporate information). 
83. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2012) (“There is 
hereby established a Securities and Exchange Commission . . . .”); The Investor’s 
Advocate, supra note 82, at 3 (chronicling the historical background in which the SEC 
was born). 
84. See Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: A Critical Review of 
the History and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
367, 368 (2008) (“Historically, the SEC’s mission has focused on investor protection.”); 
see also The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 82, at 1 (stating the mission). 
85. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984) (identifying the disclosure requirement 
as one of the two basic component of the US securities law); see also The Investor’s 
Advocate, supra note 82, at 1 (explaining that the SEC “requires public companies to 
disclose meaningful financial and other information to the public” in order to make 
sure that “all investors, whether large institutions or private individuals, should have 
access to certain basic facts about an investment prior to buying it, and so long as they 
hold it”).  
86. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2014) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . (b) 
[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading . . . .”); Steven M. Davidoff, In Corporate 
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substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact 
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made 
available.”87 The materiality of VIE risks seem undisputed, as 
they are typically disclosed as “risk factors” in the filings.88 It 
seems, however, that investor awareness of the substantial VIE 
risks may still be inadequate as a result of this disclosure 
practice.89 
II. ASSESSMENT OF INVESTMENT RISKS 
While the VIE structure has been used to evade the PRC’s 
FDI restrictions for over a decade, it remains “a matter of 
dubious legality, enforceability and sustainability.”90 Observers 
                                                                                                                            
Disclosure, a Murky Definition of Material, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2011, 5:57 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/in-corporate-disclosure-a-murky-definition-
of-material (explaining that public companies in the United States must periodically 
file reports disclosing all material information with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission). 
87.  See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 225 (1988) (expressly adopting the 
standard of materiality articulated in TSC Industries v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 
(1976)); cf. Davidoff, supra note 86 (characterizing the materiality standard is 
subjective, which “allows lawyers and others to argue that something is not material 
because they didn’t think it was certain or important enough to affect the stock price of 
the company significantly”). 
88. See Dickinson, supra note 38 (recognizing that companies clearly describe in 
their filings details about the VIE structure of their business, such that as a practical 
matter, it may be difficult to claim that such risks are not disclosed); Paul Gillis, VIE 
Disclosures are Pathetic, CHINA ACCT. BLOG (Jan. 14, 2012), http://
www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/vie-disclosures-are-patheti.html (observing that 
the current state of VIE risk disclosure does not rise to the standard set by the rules 
adopted by the Financial Accounting Standard Boards in 2009). 
89. See Steve Denning, Big Banks and Derivatives: Why Another Financial Crisis is 
Inevitable, FORBES (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013/
01/08/five-years-after-the-financial-meltdown-the-water-is-still-full-of-big-sharks (“Ever 
heard of ‘variable interest entities’ aka VIEs? If not, you are not alone.”); Thomas B. 
Hatch et al., China’s Forbidden Investment: Emerging Legal Risks for Investors Who Deal with 
Chinese Variable Interest Entity (VIE) Structures, ROBINS, KAPLAN, MILLER & CIRESI LLP 
(Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.rkmc.com/resources/articles/china-s-forbidden-
investment (describing the claim in the Orient Paper lawsuit that while the VIE 
contractual arrangement is disclosed in the Form 10-K filing, the disclosure was so 
buried that it did not adequately inform the shareholders). 
90. Shen, supra note 30, at 570 (“[T]he recent Alipay case reaffirmed that the VIE 
structure, having an ad hoc character, is a matter of dubious legality, enforceability and 
sustainability.”); see Ashley Lee, Paul Gillis: VIEs No Longer Viable, INT’L FIN. L. REV. (July 
18, 2013), http://www.iflr.com/Article/3232709/Paul-Gillis-VIEs-no-longer-viable.html 
(discussing the VIE’s increasingly uncertain viability). 
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have called it “the single biggest ‘time bomb’” and “one of the 
greatest investment frauds ever perpetrated” in the US market.91 
This Part examines the two types of legal risks inherent in 
the VIE structure and the limited legal recourse available to 
investors. Part II.A assesses the possibility that the structure be 
declared illegal or that the underlying contracts be declared 
unenforceable. Part II.B explores the limited legal recourse 
available under current law for US investors who lose control 
over the PRC-domiciled OpCo in a VIE scheme. 
A. Uncertain Legal Status 
There are essentially two inherent risks in a VIE 
investment.92 While the VIE arrangement may eventually be 
declared legal, valid, and enforceable by the PRC government, 
the presumed validity of this structure could also prove 
misguided and VIE investments could become worthless.93 Part 
I.A.1 considers the possibility that the CCP summarily declares 
the VIE structure illegal.94 Part I.A.2 examines the scenario 
where the underlying contracts creating the VIE structure are 
found invalid and unenforceable by the PRC courts.95 
                                                                                                                            
91. Benjamin Wey, Avoiding Problems: How to Identify Quality China Based Companies 
Listed on the U.S. Stock Exchanges, YAHOO (Feb. 3, 2011), http://voices.yahoo.com/
avoiding-problems-identify-quality-china-based-7702620.html?cat=3 (“China Based 
Companies with VIE Structures Are the Single Biggest ‘Time Bombs’ in the U.S. 
Markets”); Shaw et al., supra note 57 (quoting an expert’s statement that “this is one of 
the greatest investment frauds ever perpetrated in the US market”). 
92. See generally Stan Abrams, The VIE Meta-Narrative: Illegal vs. Invalid, CHINA 
HEARSAY (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.chinahearsay.com/the-vie-meta-narrative 
(differentiating the concept of the VIE investment structure being declared illegal and 
that of particular VIE contracts being unenforceable); Sasser, supra note 35 (discussing 
the regulatory risk of the PRC government’s outlawing the structure and the 
operational risk of bifurcating ownership and control); Steven M. Davidoff, Fraud 
Heightens Jeopardy of Investing in Chinese Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2012, 5:40 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/fraud-heightens-jeopardy-of-investing-in-
chinese-companies (noting the two ways a VIE investment could go wrong). 
93. See Davidoff, supra note 92 (describing two ways VIE structure may collapse). 
94. See Davidoff, supra note 92 (“The problem with [VIE] is that it may be illegal 
under Chinese law and has been criticized by Chinese regulators.”). But see 
Schindelheim, supra note 4, at 196 (noting that the PRC government has tolerated the 
VIE structure since birth and not declared it illegal). 
95. See Davidoff, supra note 92 (“Even if it is legal, if the Chinese owners decide to 
go rogue, the United States-listed entity must sue and obtain a judgment from a 
Chinese court to enforce these dubious contracts. Good luck with that. Such a litigation 
can take a long time to resolve, if ever.”); Schindelheim, supra note 4, at 220 (“[A]s the 
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1. Legality of the Structure 
Some commentators argue that various political 
calculations, including pressure from the international capital 
markets, make it unlikely that the VIE structure would be 
summarily invalidated.96 Indeed, the PRC government appears 
to have been hesitant to make a definitive statement on the 
legality of VIEs, as the Chinese economy continues to benefit 
from keeping the VIE window open.97 Notwithstanding the lack 
of clarity on the issue, recent PRC administrative actions on both 
the local and national levels support the contention that a 
general nullification of the VIE vehicle is increasingly likely.98 
At the local government level, certain provincial authorities 
have banned the formation of new VIEs.99 In March 2011, Hebei 
                                                                                                                            
foreign parent company only controls the VIE through potentially unenforceable legal 
agreements, it is possible that the domestic VIE shareholders could breach the 
agreements and take the VIE and licenses, which would force the parent company to 
sue to enforce the controversial contracts in PRC and non-PRC courts.”). 
96. See Bill Bishop, Bloomberg Keeps VIE Fears Alive: China Companies Evading Rule 
With US Listings Stump Regulators, DIGICHA (Oct. 10, 2011), http://digicha.com/
index.php/2011/10/bloomberg-keeps-vie-fears-alive-china-companies-evading-rule-
with-u-s-listings-stump-regulators/ (“[S]o many powerful interests have financial stakes 
in VIEs that it would be career suicide or worse for a Chinese bureaucrat to destroy this 
structure on a wholesale basis.”); Fredrik Öqvist, Consolidating Recent Opinions on VIEs, 
CHINA FIN. (Oct. 10, 2011), http://zhongguojinrongblog.wordpress.com/2011/10/
10/consolidating-recent-opinions-on-vies (“[T]he risk of a general government 
clampdown on listed VIEs is extremely unlikely . . . .”). 
97. See Daniel Goodman, Is China Really About To Clamp Down On The Corporate 
Structure Used For Big American IPOs?, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 21, 2011), http://
www.businessinsider.com/will-china-really-clamp-down-on-vies-2011-9 (“Until recently, 
the government has largely ignored the use of VIEs because it was either not aware, 
didn’t care, or found the activity useful at the time.”); Schindelheim, supra note 4, at 
197 (“[I]t is likely that the continued uncertainty is a deliberate policy of the Chinese 
government to selectively facilitate foreign investment in particular industries while 
limiting foreign equity ownership.”). 
98. See, e.g., Tom Shoesmith, The Future of VIEs in China, PILLSBURY WINTHROP 
SHAW PITTMAN, https://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/2012VIEsandthe
FutureofInternetRelatedInvestmentinChinav5.pdf (noting that the internet and value-
added telecom sectors are closed to foreign investment); Robert Lewis, China Watch: A 
Foreign Lawyer’s View from the Inside, LAWYER (Oct. 19, 2011), http://
www.thelawyer.com/china-watch-a-foreign-lawyers-view-from-the-inside/1009862.article 
(“The elephant in the room is that the relevant regulators could step back, look at the 
structure in the entirety, collapse it down to its essentials and declare it to be in 
violation of the applicable foreign investment restrictions and close it down.”). 
99. See CADWALADER, Understanding the VIE Structure, supra note 6, at 9 (noting 
that Buddha Steel’s withdrawal from its US IPO after certain statements were made by 
the local authorities has raised concerns among investors); Buddha Steel Inc., Report, 
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provincial authorities banned Buddha Steel from forming a VIE 
with a local steel plant, stating that the structure “contravene[d] 
current Chinese management policies related to foreign-
invested enterprises” and was “against public policy.”100 The 
announcement prompted Buddha Steel to withdraw from its 
IPO process on the NASDAQ.101 Practitioners generally view the 
incident as limited to this locality, and not necessarily reflective 
of a definitive trend in national policy.102 Yet, other observers 
have suggested that the CCP could take a case-by-case approach 
and effectuate systemic changes in a piecemeal fashion.103 In any 
event, the restrictions on VIE structures imposed by the Hebei 
province demonstrate the fundamental vulnerability of VIE 
under the PRC’s regulatory scrutiny.104 
                                                                                                                            
(Form 8-K) (Mar. 28, 2011) (“In March 2011, Baosheng Steel was advised by local 
governmental authorities in Hebei Province of the People’s Republic of China that the 
Control Agreements contravene current Chinese management policies related to 
foreign-invested enterprises and, as a result, are against public policy.”). 
100. Thomas M. Shoesmith, PRC Challenge to Variable Interest Entity Structures?, 
PILLSBURY 2 (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/
ChinaAlertPRCChallengetoVIEStructures_03_31_11pdf.pdf (“In March 2011, however, 
the local government authorities in Hebei Province apparently advised the operating 
company that the VIE agreements ‘contravene current Chinese management policies 
related to foreign-invested enterprises and are against public policy.’”); Buddha Steel 
Inc., Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 28, 2011). 
101 . See supra note 100 and accompanying text (describing Buddha Steel’s 
withdrawal from IPO after decree by Hebei provincial authority). 
102. See, e.g., Shoesmith, supra note 100, at 1 (considering the Buddha Steel 
incident as “most likely, a ‘one-off’ event driven by local facts and circumstances”); 
CADWALADER, Understanding the VIE Structure, supra note 6, at 9 (“We are inclined to 
view Buddha Steel’s IPO withdrawal as a case of a local government using China’s legal 
grey areas surrounding the VIE Structure to further its own self interest.”). 
103. See JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF CHINESE 
LAW, ITS NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT 43 (1999) (discussing the PRC’s piecemeal 
approach to lawmaking in order to cater to the fast-changing realities in the context of 
Deng’s economic reform); Dan Harris, Buying into a China VIE. What Me Worry?, CHINA 
L. BLOG (June 17, 2013), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2013/06/buying-into-a-china-
vie-what-me-worry.html (citing that the Chinese government likes to “boil its frogs 
slowly, not all at once” and that VIEs are on the wrong side of where China wants to be 
going). 
104. See Yingxi Fu-Tomlinson & Niping Wu, What the Future Holds for China’s VIE, 
KAYE SCHOLER (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.kayescholer.com/news/publications/
What-the-Future-Holds-for-Chinas-VIE-25September2012 (emphasizing “the 
underlining vulnerability of the VIE structure when facing regulatory scrutiny in 
China”); Who Owns What?, ECONOMIST, July 7, 2011, http://www.economist.com/
node/18928526 (noting the anxious debate following the Buddha Steel incident). 
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On the national level, the central CCP leadership has also 
addressed the use of VIE structures in a few instances.105 The 
actions by the central government, to the extent that they 
suggest directions of national policy, may be more alarming 
than those by provincial authorities.106  Notably, in a recent 
pronouncement, the MOFCOM expressly referenced and 
disapproved of the use of the VIE structure for the first time.107 
In August 2012, the MOFCOM approved the acquisition of a 
majority stake of Yihaodian, a PRC online retail business, by 
Walmart, a US multinational retail corporation, with the express 
condition that Walmart must not engage in Yihaodian’s value-
added services through the VIE ownership structure.108 
2. Validity of the Contracts 
Aside from a possible categorical invalidation of the 
investment structure, US investors could lose their investments if 
                                                                                                                            
105. See K&L GATES, supra note 12, at 3 (giving an overview of the recent 
government actions indicating stricter regulation of VIEs); Gao Yuan, China Approves 
Wal-Mart Control of Yihaodian, XINHUANET (Aug. 14, 2012), http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/business/2012-08/14/c_131784990.htm (“Wal-Mart 
must not engage in value-added services operated by Yihaodian through the variable 
interest entity (VIE) ownership structure, according to the ministry.”). 
106. Cf. supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing the view that the 
singular provincial government fiat in the Buddha Steel incident likely does not reflect 
trend in national policy). 
107 . See Michael Han, MOFCOM Conditionally Clears Wal-Mart’s Acquisition of 
Yihaodian, FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER (Aug. 30, 2012), http://
www.freshfields.com/en/knowledge/MOFCOM_Conditionally_Clears_Wal-Mart_
Acquisition_of_Yihaodian/?LangId=2057 (calling the pronouncement “the first time 
that MOFCOM has explicitly prohibited the use of a VIE structure when imposing a 
remedy”); Yingxi Fu-Tomlinson & Steven Wright, MOFCOM’s Conditional Approval of 
Wal-Mart’s Acquisition – What Does it Mean for Wal-Mart and Yihaodian and for the Future of 
the VIE Structure?, KAYE SCHOLER (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.kayescholer.com/news/
publications/MOFCOMs-Conditional-Approval-of-Wal-Marts-Acquisition-What-does-it-
Mean-for-Wal-Mart-and-Yihaodian-and-for-the-Future-of-the-VIE-Structure-
27September2012/_res/id=sa_File1/Fu-Wright-China-Legal-Article-09272012.pdf 
(stating that it was the first time that the MOFCOM has specifically mentioned the use 
of the structure in a formal ruling). 
108. See Gao, supra note 105; see also Susan Ning et al., MOFCOM Approved Wal-
Mart’s Acquisition of Controlling Stake in Yihaodian But Said NO to VIE Structure, KING & 
WOOD MALLESONS (Aug. 20, 2012), available at http://www.mondaq.com/x/193552/
M+A+Private%20equity/MOFCOM+Approved+WalMarts+Acquisition+of+Controlling+
Stake+in+Yihaodian+but+Said+NO+to+VIE+Structure (noting that the MOFCOM 
imposed the VIE prohibition as one of the three conditions of the acquisition). 
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the contractual foundation of VIEs collapse under manipulation 
by non-government parties.109 
The best-known example of investors’ loss of control over a 
PRC-domiciled OpCo resulting from its PRC owner’s disregard 
of VIE agreements is probably the Yahoo-Alibaba dispute in 
2011.110 The dispute arose when the founder and then-CEO of 
the Alibaba Group, the PRC’s e-commerce giant, transferred 
Alipay, a valuable subsidiary in the online payment business, to a 
separate PRC company in his name.111 Meanwhile, Yahoo, the 
US company which held a forty-three percent “ownership” 
interest in Alibaba through a VIE arrangement, did not approve 
of the transfer.112 Alibaba argued that the transfer was necessary 
for Alipay to obtain a requisite payment business permit from 
the PRC’s Central Bank.113 It was necessary because the PRC law 
prohibited non-PRC ownership in the payment business, 
whether such ownership was direct or de facto through a VIE 
                                                                                                                            
109. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text (stating the two ways a VIE 
structure may collapse). 
110. See e.g., Evelyn M. Rusli, Yahoo and Alibaba Resolve Dispute Over Alipay, N. Y. 
TIMES (July 29, 2011, 9:26 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/yahoo-
and-alibaba-resolve-alipay-dispute (calling the dispute a “simmering feud” that reached 
“soap opera proportions”); Paul Gillis, Alibaba and the Disappearing VIE, CHINA ACCT. 
BLOG (May 16, 2011), http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/alibaba-and-the-
disappearin.html (noting that the dispute was a “very public spat”). 
111. See Barboza, supra note 10 (“Jack Ma, the chairman of the Chinese Internet 
giant Alibaba, surprised investors last May when he acknowledged that he had 
transferred the assets of the company’s online payment platform to a private company 
that he controlled.”); Heightened Scrutiny to VIE Structures under the New M&A Rules, 
supra note 56 (noting that the company receiving Alipay was a purely domestic 
partnership unrelated to the US-listed entity); Roberts & Hall, supra note 51 (calling 
Alipay “the crown jewel” of the Alibaba Group). 
112. See Shaw et al., supra note 57 (noting that Yahoo’s interest in Alibaba was 
based on a VIE arrangement); Nabia Damouni & Jennifer Soba, Yahoo, Alibaba Reach 
Agreement on Alipay, CHINA DAILY (Jun. 2, 2011), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/
2011-06/02/content_12629254.htm (describing Alibaba as “43-percent-owned” by 
Yahoo). 
113. See CADWALADER, Understanding the VIE Structure, supra note 6, at 6 (“[Jack 
Ma] claimed that the spin-off was necessary because of the PBOC’s requirement to 
disclose the use of a VIE Structure when applying for a Payment Business Permit . . .”); 
cf. Loretta Chao & Amir Efrati, Yahoo’s China Feud Turns Ugly, Stock Falls, WALL. ST. J. 
(May 14, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527487
03730804576321030705428022 (“[Alibaba, Yahoo and Softbank] agree the Alipay 
transfer was done to expedite the company’s application for a necessary regulatory 
license.”). 
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structure.114 Alibaba also asserted that the transfer of Alipay was 
entirely legal, to which Yahoo did not object.115 The parties 
eventually reached a settlement without legal proceeding, on 
terms that left many Yahoo investors sorely disappointed.116 
The Yahoo-Alibaba dispute was only one of a series of 
recent heists that demonstrate the dependency of US investor 
interests on the managerial fiats or personal affairs of OpCo’s 
PRC owner-manager. 117  In April 2012, ChinaCast Education 
Corporation announced that it was unable to resume normal 
business operations after its ousted chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer had taken hostage of the company’s corporate 
seals, business licenses, and accounting records.118 Its stock was 
                                                                                                                            
114. See CADWALADER, Understanding the VIE Structure, supra note 6, at 6 (“[T]he 
relevant government officials have allegedly stated that they will not issue Payment 
Business Permits to online payment companies that have foreign ownership, whether 
directly through equity interests or indirectly through the use of the VIE Structure.”); 
Julianne Pepitone, Alibaba CEO: Yahoo Should Break Itself Up, CNN (June 1, 2011, 9:57 
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/06/01/technology/alibaba_d9_yahoo (noting 
Ma’s frustration with “people who questioned his desire to follow the Chinese 
regulatory law”). 
115. See Gary Epstein, Yahoo-Alibaba Spat Over Alipay: Jack Ma Needs to Say More, 
FORBES (May 16, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gadyepstein/2011/05/16/
yahoo-alibaba-spat-over-alipay-jack-ma-needs-to-say-more (stating that Alibaba’s CEO 
Ma had no legal obligation to Yahoo); Rusli, supra note 110 (recognizing that the 
dispute exposed the fact that “Yahoo’s fate in Asia is dictated by the whim of Mr. Ma”). 
116. See Michael Liedtke, Yahoo Settles Alibaba Dispute, Stock Still Sinks, YAHOO 
FINANCE (July 29, 2011), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Yahoo-settles-Alibaba-
dispute-apf-4229132856.html (describing JP Morgan’s analyst note “Alipay agreement: 
better than nothing, but not that great” as summing up the market’s sentiment); Rusli, 
supra note 110 (noting that David Einhorn, an influential hedge fund manager, 
“dumped his entire stake in Yahoo, saying in a letter to investors that this ‘wasn’t what 
we signed up for’”). 
117. See Davidoff, supra note 92 (citing examples of ChinaCast, Sino-Forest, 
GigaMedia in addition to Alibaba); Pilarowski, supra note 38 (citing examples of 
Shanghai T2 Entertainment, Buddha Steel in addition to Tudou). 
118 . See ChinaCast, Open Letter from ChinaCast’s Board of Directors to 
Shareholders (Apr. 2, 2012), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/open-letter-from-chinacasts-board-of-directors-to-our-shareholders-
145781235.html (“Ron Chan and a few other executives have chosen to unlawfully 
resist their terminations by refusing to return key company property, including 
corporate chops necessary to run the business in China.”); SEC Press Release, SEC 
Charges China-Based Executives with Fraud and Insider Trading (Sept. 26, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539844443#.
UwkQpoXJzxM (“The SEC alleges that ChinaCast Education Corporation’s former 
CEO and chairman of the board Chan Tze Ngon illicitly transferred $41 million out of 
the $43.8 million raised from investors to a purported subsidiary in which he secretly 
held a controlling 50 percent ownership stake.”). 
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suspended from trading on the same day and its market 
capitalization plummeted from US$200 million to US$5 million 
as a result of the executive’s misconduct and other related 
frauds. 119  The ChinaCast episode was reminiscent of the 
Gigamedia incident in 2010, in which the online gaming 
company listed on the NASDAQ failed to extract profits from 
the PRC-domiciled OpCo.120 There, the ousted chief executive 
of the OpCo similarly breached the VIE contracts, stopped 
answering to the WFOE, and refused to give up possession of the 
OpCo’s corporate seals and other documents necessary for its 
operation.121 Even personal affairs of the PRC OpCo’s owner-
manager, such as soured marital relationship, could threaten US 
investments. 122  For example, the messy divorce of Tudou’s 
founder delayed and almost derailed its IPO, causing the 
company and its selling shareholders potential monetary loss in 
the tens of millions of dollars due to declined market 
condition.123 
                                                                                                                            
119. See Paul Gillis, Another China Heist?, CHINA ACCT. BLOG (Apr. 2, 2012), 
http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/another-chinese-heist.html?utm_
source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+
Chinaaccountingblog+%28China+Accounting+Blog%29 (observing that companies 
whose stock was suspended from trading like ChinaCast rarely come back from these 
kinds of problems); SEC Charges China-Based Executives with Fraud and Insider Trading, 
supra note 114 (noting that ChinaCast’s market capitalization dropped from US$200 
million to US$5 million after the misconduct was publicly disclosed). 
120. See Gillis, supra note 119 (“We have seen this movie before – Gigamedia.”); 
Davidoff, supra note 92 (arguing that such fraudulent behaviors are not isolated 
incidents). 
121. See Lawrence, supra note 6 (“When GigaMedia tried to replace its China 
head last year, he refused to step down or turn over the VIE documents and assets 
necessary for GigaMedia to run its business in China . . . .”); CADWALADER, 
Understanding the VIE Structure, supra note 6, at 8 (stating the WFOE’s inability to pay 
dividends as a result); Davidoff, supra note 92 (“GigaMedia appears to have given up on 
getting the business back.”). 
122. See Pilarowski, supra note 38 (identifying “the founder’s wife” as the newest 
China risk factor); Owen Fletcher, IPO Filing Exposes Tudou’s Ex-Wife Problem, WALL ST. 
J. (May 3, 2011, 8:15 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/05/03/ipo-filing-
exposes-tudou%E2%80%99s-ex-wife-problem (“In the latest tale from the wild west that 
is China’s Internet sector, a lawsuit between former lovers has complicated business for 
online video company Tudou Holdings as it aims to list shares in the U.S.”). 
123. See Lawrence, supra note 6 (noting that Tudou’s IPO was delayed by a lawsuit 
in which the ex-wife of founder Gary Wei Wang claimed a share in 76 percent of the 
VIE’s equity); Pilarowski, supra note 38 (“Normally, a messy divorce for the founder 
wouldn’t derail an IPO, particularly when he holds only 12.7% of the company’s shares, 
as was the case for Tudou. But in the world of Chinese internet companies, with 
byzantine corporate structures designed to evade China’s foreign ownership 
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Those prior incidences demonstrate the potential 
consequences of misaligned interests between the PRC owners 
of the OpCo and US investors in the ListCo.124 Misalignment of 
interests can occur when the stock price of the ListCo is 
persistently depressed, or when the OpCo no longer feels the 
need for overseas financing or technology know-how.125 
Furthermore, it is likely that the situations in which OpCo’s 
PRC owner-manager breaches the VIE agreements, the PRC 
courts would rule in favor of the PRC individuals at the expense 
of US investors.126 In the high-profile Chinachem case in 2013, 
the PRC’s highest court, the Supreme People’s Court, 
invalidated VIE-like contracts on the ground that they inherently 
subverted the Contract Law of the PRC.127 According to Article 
51 of the Contract Law of the PRC, a contract is invalid when 
                                                                                                                            
restrictions, that is exactly what happened. . . . If the company had completed its IPO in 
December 2010 and received the same revenue multiple as Youku, Tudou would have 
been valued at $1,026 million, which is over $200 million more than its actual IPO 
valuation.”). 
124 . See Fredrik Öqvist, Who Owns What? Or, Aligning Incentives in 
VIE Organisations, CHINA FIN. BLOG (Jul. 19, 2011), http://
zhongguojinrongblog.wordpress.com/2011/07/19/who-owns-what-or-aligning-
incentives-in-vie-organisations (discussing incentive alignment under different OpCo 
ownership structures); Robert Lewis, Foreign Investors in China Using the Variable Jnterest 
Entity Structure, LAWYER (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.thelawyer.com/foreign-investors-
in-china-using-the-variable-interest-entity-structure/1010207.article (suggesting 
strategies to minimize risks of misaligned incentives). 
125. See Lawrence, supra note 6 (counting low share valuations as one potential 
reason of misalignment of interests between the ListCo and the OpCo); Wong, supra 
note 1 (“Problems arise if the Chinese partners decide they don’t want to follow the 
contracts any longer because, for example, they already have the money and know-how 
they were seeking, as has happened in several instances.”). 
126. See I-Ching Ng, The Dark Cloud Over the Variable Interest Entity, CORP. TREAS. 
(July 18, 2013), http://www.thecorporatetreasurer.com/OpinionEntry/350505,the-
dark-cloud-over-the-variable-interest-entity.aspx (“It is likely that Chinese courts will 
find the terms and conditions typically found in the VIE contracts to be excessively 
favorable towards foreign investors . . . .”); Leahy & Hirsch, supra note 63 (“In the 
event of a contract dispute with a PRC national over a VIE deal, investors should ask 
themselves how confident they can be that the PRC courts will uphold the validity of 
complex contracts in favor of foreign investors at the expense of PRC nationals?”). 
127. See Gough, supra note 58 (“In what appears to be the first time that high-
ranking Chinese authorities have weighed in on the issue of foreign control 
agreements, the court ruled that the contracts . . . were invalid . . . [as they] had clearly 
been intended to circumvent China’s restrictions on foreign investment, and 
amounted to ‘concealing illegal intentions with a lawful form.’”); Ng, supra note 126 
(“After the decade-long legal battle . . . lawyers quickly sensed China’s supreme court 
decision to nullify Chinachem’s entrustment contracts has cast a dark cloud over the 
future of [VIE] structures.”). 
2014] PERILS OF INVESTING IN VIES 1295 
“there is an attempt to conceal illegal goals under the disguise 
of legitimate forms.”128 This ruling is generally considered a 
rejection by the PRC’s highest judicial authority of the 
assumption that PRC officials had tacitly approved the popular 
VIE structure.129 
In sum, given the current legal landscape, investing in VIEs 
is precarious. 130  The VIE structure stands on a precarious 
footing in terms of its legality at both the local and national 
levels of the PRC government.131 At the same time, the PRC 
courts are unlikely to uphold the validity of VIE contracts 
because contracts that effectively circumvent PRC law are 
unlawful under the PRC contract law.132 As a result, the value of 
any VIE investment is ultimately contingent on the integrity and 
goodwill of the PRC partners and, to a limited extent, external 
restraints such as reputational concerns.133 
                                                                                                                            
128 . Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hetongfa (中华人民共和国合同法 ) 
[Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Second Sess. of 
the Ninth Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 1999). 
129. See Gough, supra note 59 (“This case shows that contracts used to get around 
China’s foreign investment restrictions can be struck down by the courts ... Until then, 
many observers had come to regard the general absence of an official response as a 
sign of tacit approval.”); Vincent Mu, Thinking Long Term, CHINA L. & PRAC. 
(Nov./Dec. 2013), http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/3262360/Thinking-
long-term.html (suggesting that the ruling signifies “negative attitude of the Supreme 
People’s Courts towards VIEs . . . and should make investors very wary”). But see Charles 
Comey et al., China VIEs: Recent Developments and Observations, MORRISON & FOERSTER, 
(Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/130716-Variable-
Interest-Entities-China.pdf (distinguishing the ruling as one that involved entrustment 
arrangement rather than the typical VIE, therefore any prediction of its implication for 
VIEs is premature). 
130. See supra Part II.A.1–.2 (examining the two ways that VIE structures may 
collapse). 
131. See supra Part II.A.1 (noting that the PRC government may outlaw the VIE 
structure summarily). 
132. See supra Part II.A.2 (indicating that VIE contracts may turn out to be 
unenforceable when breached). 
133. See Wong, supra note 1 (arguing that every VIE operates by the grace of its 
Chinese partner); Don’t Bank on It, WEEK IN CHINA (Jun. 14, 2013), http://
www.weekinchina.com/msingle/?mpage=17880 (quoting the Economic Observer 
which said that most VIE structures are only morally binding and offer investors little 
legal protection). 
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B. Investor Rights: Vindication and Enforcement 
VIE investors have very limited legal recourse if disputes 
materialize over their control of the OpCo.134 However, there 
are three potential forums where US investors may seek to 
enforce their “ownership” rights: (1) the PRC jurisdiction where 
the OpCo and the WFOE are domiciled and presumably under 
whose law the VIE contracts are governed; (2) the US 
jurisdiction where the ListCo shares are publically listed and 
traded; and (3) the intermediary jurisdiction where the ListCo is 
domiciled.135 In practice, though, the PRC may be the only 
jurisdiction for a US investor to sue the OpCo or its owner-
manager. 136  It seems that choice of law provisions are 
inconsequential in VIE agreements, and that these contracts are 
always governed by PRC law.137 Finally, even if the contracts 
stipulate to a non-PRC forum, the choice may provide no better 
recourse to US investors because judgments by the many non-
PRC jurisdictions, including the United States, are not 
                                                                                                                            
134. See Dan Harris, Everything You Always Wanted to Know about China VIEs. The 
Transcript, CHINA LAW BLOG (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2011/11/
everything_you_always_wanted_to_know_about_china_vies_the_transcript.html 
(“[E]veryone seemed to agree that Chinese courts will not enforce the contracts on 
which VIE structures are based.”); Hatch, supra note 89 (“[S]ince most U.S.-listed 
Chinese companies have little or no assets in the United States, the scope of recovery 
afforded by lawsuits against these companies is generally limited to these companies’ 
directors and officers insurance policies.”). 
135. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (showing that a typical US-listed 
PRC-domiciled VIE touches three types of jurisdictions: the PRC, the United States, 
and the intermediary offshore financial center jurisdiction or jurisdictions). 
136. See Hatch, supra note 89 (noting that the scope of recovery in a successful 
VIE lawsuit in US courts is generally limited to the company’s D&O insurance); Zhang 
Shouzhi et al., Forum Shopping for Dispute Resolution: Hurdles and Solutions, KING & WOOD 
MALLESONS (Jan. 2010), http://www.kingandwood.com/article.aspx?id=Forum-
Shopping-for-Dispute-Resolution-Hurdles-and-Solutions&language=en (noting that 
“[m]ost countries with closest economic ties with China, such as US, Great Britain, 
Canada, Japan and BVI, have not concluded civil and commercial legal assistance 
treaties with China” that are required for the enforcement of judgment rendered by a 
non-PRC forum state). 
137. See Davidoff, supra note 92 (noting that in the event that VIE contracts are 
disputed, the US-listed entity must sue and obtain a favorable judgment from a PRC 
court to enforce them); Hatch, supra note 89 (observing that VIE investors suing in US 
courts generally seek recovery by alleging false and misleading statements rather than 
by enforcing the VIE contracts). 
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enforceable in the PRC.138 This is certainly true when such 
judgment contravenes the PRC law or public policy.139 
Based on the foregoing, it is problematic for US investors to 
seek enforcement of their contractual rights under a VIE 
arrangement by way of lawsuit in the PRC.140 First, if the CCP 
declares the VIE structure per se illegal, then the contracts that 
make up the structure would be void. 141  Second, absent a 
categorical pronouncement by the CCP, US investors may find it 
practically impossible to convince the PRC courts that the VIE 
contracts, which are designed to conceal the illegal intention of 
circumventing the PRC’s FDI prohibitions, should be 
enforced.142 Third, the PRC courts are known for their lack of 
judicial independence.143 As the PRC central authority continues 
                                                                                                                            
138. See Dan Harris, Suing Chinese Companies In US Courts. The Pros And The Cons, 
CHINA L. BLOG (Jun. 27, 2011), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2011/06/suing_
chinese_companies_in_us_courts_the_pros_and_the_cons.html (“US judgments have 
virtually no value in China.”); Peter Thorp & Huawei Sun, Arbitration Guide ei Sun,, 
INT’L BAR ASSOC. 1 (Feb. 2012), http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?
ArticleUid=a646cf32-0ad8-4666-876b-c3d045028e64 (“[F]oreign court judgments are 
very difficult to enforce in the PRC due to a lack of mutual enforceability treaties with 
other countries.”). 
139. See Sun Jin & Xue Junge, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign-related 
Judgment in China, ZHEJIANG XINMU L. FIRM (June 23, 2013), http://
www.xinmulawyer.com/els.asp?id=20 (“According to the provisions of article 267 and 
268 in Civil Procedure Law, if foreign court’s judgment want to be recognized and 
enforced by China’s court, the judgment should satisfy the following conditions: The 
judgment or written order should be legally effective . . . the judgment doesn’t 
contradict the basic principle of the law of People’s Republic of China, nor violate State 
sovereignty, security and social and public interest of the country.”); Lily Chan, 
Enforcing U.S. Court Judgments in China, AM. BAR ASSOC., http://apps.americanbar.org/
intlaw/committees/regional_comparative/china/EnforcingUSJudgementsPRC.pdf 
(last visited on Feb. 26, 2014) (explaining that a non-PRC judgment is not recognized if 
the PRC court determines that it violates fundamental principles of PRC law, and that 
PRC courts have wide discretion in evaluating whether to enforce foreign judgments). 
140. See supra Part II.A.1–.2 (examining the two ways that VIE structures may 
collapse). 
141. See supra Part II.A.1 (suggesting that the PRC government may declare the 
structure illegal). 
142. See Aubin, supra note 13 (“To the extent a VIE contract structure is designed 
to circumvent the requirements of Chinese law, such contracts are void…not voidable, 
void. It is as if they did not exist.”); Leahy & Hirsch, supra note 63 (“Should Chinese 
VIE-owners breach contractual agreements, it is unclear whether Chinese courts would 
enforce foreign investors’ rights”). 
143. See Benedict Sheehy, Fundamentally Conflicting Views of the Rule of Law in China 
and the West & Implications for Commercial Disputes, 26 NW. J. INT’L L & BUS. 2 (2006), 
(noting that law is but a tool of the Chinese Communist Party, which alone is the “basis 
of power and influence as well as the basis of all law”); Megha Rajagopalan & Ben 
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to tighten control around VIEs by legislative and administrative 
acts, the likelihood of a judicial ruling that safeguards the VIE 
structure has substantially declined.144 As a result, lawyers have 
almost never sought to enforce VIE contracts in a PRC court.145 
Instead of bringing a lawsuit, US investors might pursue 
alternative dispute resolution methods, such as arbitration.146 
Nevertheless, arbitration in the PRC may be unlikely to yield 
favorable results for non-PRC investors, for the same reasons 
lawsuits in PRC are expected to fail.147 Indeed, in the two recent 
                                                                                                                            
Blanchard, China’s Top Court Urges Judicial Independence, End to Interference, REUTERS 
(Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/29/us-china-courts-idUS
BRE99S0HB20131029 (“China must rid its courts of corruption and stop officials 
interfering in decisions, a paper on reforms by the top court said on Tuesday, referring 
to a judicial system that answers to the Communist Party and almost never sides with 
defendants.”). 
144. See supra notes 127–129 and accompanying text (explaining the recent 
judicial ruling that the VIE-like structures contravene public policy and are illegal); 
supra note 143 (describing the PRC courts’ lack of independence from political 
influences). 
145. See Leahy & Hirsch, supra note 63 (“The common theme to all of these 
disputes is that none of them was resolved in a conventional litigation strategy, but 
rather each was negotiated commercially.”); Shen, supra note 30, at 570 (“To date, the 
VIE structure has never been tested in a PRC court and there is therefore no certainty 
that the legality of such structure will be recognised or that such a structure will not 
encounter regulatory scrutiny (or even a crackdown) at a later stage.”); Aubin, supra 
note 13 (“Lawyers said they do not expect a rash of legal challenges to VIEs. But on the 
rare occasions when VIEs are challenged, U.S. investors nearly always lose . . . ‘I’ve yet 
to see a situation where shareholders have gotten their hands on Chinese assets in an 
adversarial situation.’”). 
146 . See Weixia Gu, Arbitration in China, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION IN ASIA 77 (Shahla Ali & Tom Ginsburg eds., 3d ed. 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2263058 (“Litigating cross-
border business disputes in [the PRC’s] national courts poses various problems and 
uncertainties . . . Arbitration is today regarded as an indispensable tool designed to 
afford parties engaged in international trade and investment the requisite of certainty 
and confidence that rightly demand for dispute resolution in the international 
transactions.”); Terence Tung, Commercial Arbitration in the People’s Republic of China, 
MAYER BROWN (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/
Commercial-Arbitration-in-the-Peoples-Republic-of-China-01-19-2010 (“The [PRC] now 
conducts more arbitrations than any other country and has become of one the most 
important places for commercial arbitrations in the world.”). 
147. See Gough, supra note 58 (“Since 2010, Shanghai’s arbitration board has 
invalidated two variable interest entities that had been used by foreign companies to 
control onshore businesses. In one case involving an online game company, the panel 
applied China’s contract law to reach the same conclusion as the supreme court in the 
Chinachem case — saying that the variable-interest entities were ‘concealing illegal 
intentions with a lawful form.’”); Jiang Rongqing & Zhu Biyun, China: Recent Concerns 
on Foreign Investment in China and VIE, DACHENG L. OFFICES (July 15, 2013), available at 
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cases arbitrated in Shanghai, the VIE agreements were ruled as 
void on the ground that they impermissibly circumvented 
existing PRC law by effectively enabling overseas investments 
into PRC businesses via contractual means. 148  Alternatively, 
investors may seek arbitration in a non-PRC arbitration tribunal 
if the VIE agreements have provided so.149 In that case, they run 
the risk of relief not being enforced if the PRC courts deem the 
arbitral award a violation of existing law or public policy.150 
In sum, if VIE fails, by means of either PRC government 
decree, managerial rift, or other operational or governance 
decision, it is exceedingly difficult for US investors to use 
judicial means to recover their investment losses.151 Accordingly, 
                                                                                                                            
http://www.mondaq.com/x/250690/international+trade+investment/Recent+
Concerns+on+Foreign+Investment+and+VIE (concluding from the two arbitration 
cases that VIE contracts adopted to get around the PRC’s FDI restrictions or 
prohibitions could be invalidated by either the court or the arbitration tribunal); Paul 
Gillis, Is It Safe to Go Back in the Water?, CHINA ACCOUNTING BLOG (June 7, 2013, 6:54 
PM), http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/is-it-safe-to-go-back-in.html 
(“[N]o one has ever succeeded in enforcing the agreements[,] and every time it has 
come before a judge or arbitrator[,] the agreements have been found invalid.”). 
148. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (summarizing the rulings of the 
two arbitration cases). 
149. See Thorp & Sun, supra note 138, at 1 (“Although the PRC court system 
continues to improve, foreign companies dealing with China-related matters often 
prefer to use arbitration due to their lack of familiarity with the PRC courts and the 
easier cross-border enforceability of arbitral awards as compared to court judgments.”); 
New York Convention Countries, N.Y. ARB. CONV, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/
contracting-states/list-of-contracting-states (last visited on Feb. 24, 2014) (identifying 
China as a contracting country to the New York Convention since 1987). 
150 . See U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, art. V.1, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter 
New York Convention] (“Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused 
. . . [if] said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected 
it . . . .”); Henry L. T. Chen & B. Ted Howes, “Public Policy” and the Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitration Awards in China, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Nov. 22, 2010), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f96e8738-5cfe-4e39-8d1d-
7a6dbfbd4c21 (discussing prior cases, including one involving contradiction to the 
country’s administrative regulations, where the PRC courts applied the public policy 
exception under the New York Convention). But see Thorp & Sun, supra note 138, at 21 
(arguing that refusal to enforce arbitration award on public policy ground rarely 
occurs). 
151. See Aubin, supra note 13 (“In practice, if things go wrong, foreign investors in 
a VIE may have very few legal rights . . . .”); supra notes 138, 145 and accompanying text 
(suggesting that it is virtually impossible that the VIE agreements can be enforced). 
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investors may have no better choice than to settle for inadequate 
remedy of some sort, as in the Yahoo-Alibaba case.152 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
Part III urges the SEC to carefully scrutinize and regulate 
publicly traded, PRC-domiciled VIEs to protect US investors.153 
Without action targeted at addressing the use of the VIE 
structure, these entities could lead to severe losses by the US 
investing public without redress. 154  Specifically, Part III 
recommends that the SEC take two immediate actions to better 
inform US investors of the inherent risks of VIEs. Part III.A. calls 
for an investor warning through the Office of Investor 
Education and Advocacy to explain the legal and regulatory risks 
of the VIE structure. Part III.B recommends that risk disclosure 
languages related to the unique VIE risks be more prominently 
featured in SEC filings. 
There are three key reasons for the United States to 
implement regulatory reform to protect investors from the 
damaging impact of a VIE collapse.155 First, ex post remedy 
                                                                                                                            
152. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (recalling the disappointment of 
Yahoo investors in Yahoo’s settlement with Alibaba); Zeng Xianwu & Bai Lihui, Variable 
Interest Entity Structure in China, KING & WOOD MALLESONS (Feb. 9, 2013), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a9d30374-f27f-4be7-84b8-
2a3772ee84cf (“The result [of PRC individuals or domestic company not performing 
their obligations under the VIE contracts] is typically difficult, expensive and time-
consuming dispute resolution process, which may lead to some kind of settlement or, 
alternatively, the foreign investor giving up on the PRC domestic company and their 
presence in China.”). 
153. See supra Part II.A–.B (analyzing the inherent risks of VIEs and the limited 
legal recourse available to investors); Davidoff, supra note 92 (“The Securities and 
Exchange Commission and Washington seem to be almost as absent. . . . The United 
States government has also not pressed China to vigorously and quickly enforce its own 
laws to help American shareholders.”). But see Paul Gillis, VIE Disclosures to Come to Hong 
Kong, CHINA ACCT. BLOG (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/
weblog/vie-disclosures-to-come-to.html (“The SEC has paid great attention to the 
disclosures related to VIEs and investors today have considerably more data to evaluate 
the risks of these structures.”). 
154 . See supra Part II.B (examining the limited legal recourse available to 
investors). 
155. See Steve Denning, Big Banks and Derivatives: Why Another Financial Crisis Is 
Inevitable, FORBES (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013/
01/08/five-years-after-the-financial-meltdown-the-water-is-still-full-of-big-sharks (“Ever 
heard of ‘variable interest entities’ aka VIEs? If not, you are not alone. They are 
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creation is expected to produce inadequate results.156 This is 
because the PRC courts and arbitrators are unlikely to uphold 
and enforce VIE agreements, and may not enforce non-PRC 
judgments or arbitral awards against PRC entities or 
individuals.157 Additionally, there is little reason to expect that 
the PRC would help recoup US investment losses or cooperate 
with US regulators.158 Second, the market is unlikely to self-
correct in time because there is an inherent conflict of 
interest.159 All of the active participants in the VIE scheme have 
distinct monetary incentives to prolong the appearance of 
enforceable legality in order to generate transaction fees.160 
Third, the regulatory efforts to date are limited and 
insufficient.161 
                                                                                                                            
phenomena that reside in what The Atlantic calls ‘an ever lower circle of financial hell’ 
than proprietary trading.”); Davidoff, supra note 92 (suggesting that the SEC is yet to 
take effective action to address the VIE issue). 
156 . See supra note 145 and accompanying text (noting that merits of VIE 
agreements have almost never been contested in PRC courts); Zeng & Bai, supra note 
150 (suggesting that investors will likely settle or simply give up any claim it may have 
over the PRC OpCo). 
157. See supra Part II.B (concluding that US investors are unlikely to obtain 
adequate recovery in VIE disputes). 
158. See e.g., The SEC Shouldn’t Forget that Beijing Always Wins, CHINA ECON. REV. 
(Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/china-on-wall-street-sec-csrc-
showdown-big-four-auditors (arguing that PRC regulators will not cooperate with the 
SEC in the heated dispute over the Big Four accounting firms’ China practice, partly 
because they have never been enthusiastic about US investors buying into mainland 
companies); Mosk et al., supra note 64 (“The Chinese government snubbed a US 
request for help in cracking down on a string of alleged investment frauds that have 
cost Americans billions . . . .”). 
159. See Davidoff, supra note 92 (“It is not just a problem of a questionable legal 
structure, but Wall Street’s apparent willingness to ignore the fact that investors in the 
United States have tenuous claims when they buy shares in Chinese companies. And 
underwriters and Chinese issuers have taken advantage of the hunger for Chinese 
stocks.”); Dan Harris, Buying into a China VIE. What Me Worry?, CHINA L. BLOG (Jun. 17, 
2013), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2013/06/buying-into-a-china-vie-what-me-
worry.html (“Accountants, lawyers and stock brokers make a ton of money off IPOs so 
they . . . have every incentive to keep the [VIE] structure going.”). 
160. See supra note 159 (noting that the fees generated by VIEs incentivize 
underwriters, brokers, accounts and lawyers to create more VIEs while they can). 
161. See Fu-Tomlinson & Wu, supra note 104 (noting that the New Oriental 
investigation was the first time the SEC “formally question[s] whether a VIE structure 
adopted by a China-based company listed in the US provides ‘sufficient basis for 
consolidation’”); Lawrence, supra note 6 (arguing that the US is still seen as “the 
paradise for VIEs” due to its lax regulation over the structure). 
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A. Investor Warning 
The popularity of the VIE structure shares several key 
attributes with the reverse merger wave of PRC-domiciled 
companies in the 2000s.162 Both became popular by enabling 
these businesses to access the US capital markets.163 Both involve 
legal structures and financial jargon that are atypical among 
public companies and confusing to the general public.164 Both 
generate handsome profits for the professionals involved in the 
transactions. 165  Both exist in a near “regulatory vacuum” 
between the United States and the PRC.166 Most importantly, 
both have caused, or have the potential to cause, substantial 
losses to even sophisticated institutional investors who are 
                                                                                                                            
162. See Nanette Byrnes & Lynnley Browning, Special Report: China’s Shortcut to Wall 
Street, REUTERS (Aug 1, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/01/us-shell-
china-idUSTRE7702S520110801 (explaining reverse merger transactions which enable 
PRC companies to list in the US). But see Brendan Conway, Chinese Structure for Tapping 
U.S. Markets Draws Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2011, 1:16 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204138204576598843235826
866 (noting a key distinction between the VIE and reverse merger issues). 
163. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (noting that companies favor VIE to 
access overseas financing); Byrnes & Browning, supra note 162 (noting that PRC 
companies use reverse merger as a short cut to list in the US). 
164. See Hardy Zhu, Complex Structures for Investing in China, MATTHEWS ASIA 
(Sept. 2012), http://matthewsasia.com/perspectives-on-asia/asia-insight/article-560/
default.fs (noting that PRC-based VIE entities have complex corporate legal 
structures); David Barboza & Azam Ahmed, Muddy Waters Research is a Thorn to Some 
Chinese Companies, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2011, 9:20 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2011/06/09/muddy-waters-research-is-a-thorn-to-some-chinese-companies (“[T]he 
Securities and Exchange Commission warned about the potential risks of investing in 
reverse-merger companies, including murky financials and complicated ownership 
structures.”). 
165. See Walter Pavlo, Reverse Mergers – Pushers May Be the Problem, FORBES (Apr. 
15, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2011/04/15/reverse-mergers-
pushers-may-be-the-problem (noting that profit-seeking pushers and dealers are at the 
center of the troubling reverse merger transactions); supra notes 159, 160 and 
accompanying text (indicating the disincentives of bankers, lawyers, and accountants to 
stop VIEs in the tracks). 
166. Csordas, supra note 16, at 386 (“Some have described the oversight of 
‘foreign private issuers,’ including Chinese companies listed on US securities 
exchanges, as a ‘regulatory vacuum,’ with neither the United States nor China 
effectively monitoring those companies.”); supra note 63 and accompanying text 
(arguing that the PRC government is incentivized to leave VIE in the legal gray area for 
as long as it deems beneficial). 
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typically presumed to understand the risks of their 
investments.167 
The SEC should look to past practices and issue a similar 
warning it used to address the risks related to reverse merger.168 
In June 2011, in response to the increasing number of securities 
fraud scandals involving PRC companies that went public in the 
United States via reverse merger transactions, the SEC’s Office 
of Investor Education and Advocacy issued an announcement 
titled “Investor Bulletin: Reverse Merger,” in which it addressed 
the common risks of the companies at issue and the typical 
pattern of frauds.169 The announcement prompted immediate 
discussion and attention in the financial press.170 
Similarly, the proposed VIE warning should analyze the 
legal and regulatory risks of investing in VIEs and include 
                                                                                                                            
167. See supra Part II.B (analyzing the limited legal recourse available to VIE 
investors who seek remedy when their investment goes wrong); M. Norman Goldberger 
& Laura Krabill, Fraud Prevalent in Reverse Merger Companies with Operations in China, 
BALLARD SPAHR LLP (July 8, 2011), http://www.ballardspahr.com/AlertsPublications/
Articles/2011-07-08_Fraud_Prevalent_in_Reverse_Merger_Companies_with_
Operations_in_China (“There have been enough instances of serious securities fraud 
in these [reverse merger] companies (and enough instances where sophisticated 
investors have been damages with no recourse) that the old adage ‘buyer beware’ is 
particularly true.”). 
168. See supra notes 162–67 and accompanying text (comparing and identifying 
the similarities between VIEs and reverse mergers involving US-listed, PRC-based 
companies); Scott Eden, SEC Warns on Reverse Merger Stocks, STREET (Jun. 9, 2011, 5:08 
PM), http://www.thestreet.com/story/11148562/1/sec-warns-on-reverse-merger-
stocks.html (“The Securities and Exchange Commission put out an investor bulletin 
Thursday afternoon warning the world of potential fraud among companies that came 
public in the U.S. through a controversial method called a reverse merger.”). 
169 . See SEC OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUC. & ADVOCACY, INVESTOR BULLETIN: 
REVERSE MERGERS (June 2011), https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/reverse
mergers.pdf; SEC Press Release, SEC Issues Bulletin on Risks of Investing in Reverse 
Merger Companies (June 9, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-
123.htm [hereinafter INVESTOR BULLETIN] (“The Investor Bulletin explains the reverse 
merger process, describes the potential risks of investing in reverse merger companies, 
and details some of the recent enforcement actions that the agency has brought against 
reverse merger companies.”). 
170. See e.g., Azam Ahmed, S.E.C. Issues Warning About Reverse-Merger Stocks, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 9, 2011, 2:42 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/s-e-c-issues-
warning-about-reverse-merger-stocks; Michael Rapoport, Regulators Warn Investors on 
‘Reverse-Merger’ Companies, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 10, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424052702304259304576375773471908358; Joshua Gallu, ‘Reverse-
Merger’ Stocks May Be Prone to Fraud, Abuse, SEC Says in Warning, BLOOMBERG NEWS 
(Jun. 9, 2011, 2:26 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-09/-reverse-
merger-stocks-may-be-prone-to-fraud-abuse-sec-says-in-warning.html. 
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examples of VIE-related risk disclosure language found in the 
SEC filings.171 It should provide a list of incidents where US 
investors have lost control of the PRC-domiciled VIEs, followed 
by a brief discussion of each case.172 Finally, it should conclude 
by recommending that investors be particularly cautious and 
take diligent care in understanding the risks inherent in a VIE’s 
corporate structure before investing. 173  Based on prior 
experience, the SEC may expect the proposed announcement to 
draw the immediate attention of the media.174 Increased media 
coverage of the issue helps foster wider public discussion, which 
in turn enhances the general understanding of and alertness to 
the issue.175 
B. Prioritized Risk Disclosure 
As a second recommendation, the SEC should enhance the 
visibility of the risk disclosure related to the unique legal and 
                                                                                                                            
171. See INVESTOR BULLETIN, supra note 169, at 2–3 (describing in plain English 
the risks of investing in reverse merger companies and citing examples of risk factor 
disclosures that reverse merger companies have used in their SEC filings); Stephen E. 
Fox & Irwin Kishner, SEC Warns Investors about Investing in Reverse Merger Companies, 
HERRICK FEINSTEIN LLP (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.
aspx?g=7faae2bd-5c96-40c1-8f72-b1a04af66c1e (summarizing the potential risks with 
investing in reverse merger companies that were mentioned in the Bulletin). 
172. See INVESTOR BULLETIN, supra note 169, at 3–4 (listing recent enforcement 
actions involving reverse merger companies with brief discussion of each action); Fox & 
Kishner, supra note 171 (“[The Bulletin] also discusses six reverse merger companies 
that had their stock suspended from trading by the SEC in recent months, and states 
that the SEC has recently revoked the securities registration of ‘several’ reverse merger 
companies.”). 
173. See INVESTOR BULLETIN, supra note 169, at 4 (“Investors should be careful 
when considering investing in the stocks of reverse merger companies and should 
make sure that they have accurate and up-to-date information about a company before 
investing.”); Fox & Kishner, supra note 171 (summarizing the specific tips for investor 
due diligence recommended in the Bulletin). 
174. See supra note 168 (examples of major media reporting on the SEC investor 
bulletin warning about investing in reverse merger companies). But see Eden, supra 
note 168 (observing the critique that SEC’s warning had come too little too late). 
175. See e.g., Anne-Katrin Arnold, Media Effects I: Agenda Setting, WORLD BANK 
ORG. BLOG (Dec. 22, 2009), https://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/media-effects-
i-agenda-setting (suggesting that the more attention media devotes to an issue, the 
more important the public perceives the issue to be); Dietram A. Scheufele & David 
Tewskbury, Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects 
Models, 57 J. COMM. 9, 11 (2007) (noting that the characterization of an issue in the 
news reports can have an influence on how it is understood by audiences). 
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regulatory risks of the VIE structure.176 While companies already 
disclose those material risks in technical compliance with 
relevant SEC rules, the disclosure is often lengthy, difficult to 
understand, and effectively buried under pages of dense, 
boilerplate language. 177  As such, the current disclosure 
requirement inadequately serves the SEC’s main regulatory 
objective—to protect investors by ensuring that disclosures are 
truly informative.178 While addressing the general inadequacies 
of risk disclosure practice is an ongoing effort that requires far 
more reflection and discussion, the SEC should not hesitate 
from embracing effective piecemeal measures to promote 
understanding of the VIE-specific risks in the interim.179 
The SEC must prioritize the disclosure of VIE-specific risks 
over that of generic economy or industry -wide risks through two 
new reporting requirements for VIEs.180 First, the SEC should 
                                                                                                                            
176. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (indicating that the current state of 
VIE risk disclosure is inadequate). 
177. See Dickinson, supra note 38 (recognizing that companies clearly describe in 
their filings details about the VIE structure of their business, such that as a practical 
matter, it may be difficult to claim that such risks are not disclosed); Gillis, supra note 
88 (observing that the current state of VIE risk disclosure does not rise to the standard 
set by the rules adopted by the Financial Accounting Standard Boards in 2009); e.g., 
supra note 5 (regarding the Sina and RenRen 2013 annual reports, liberally referring to 
“our China operations” and “our products and services” as if the OpCo is owned by the 
ListCo). 
178. See, e.g., HARVEY L. PITT, SEC ORAL TESTIMONY: ACCOUNTING AND INVESTOR 
PROTECTION ISSUES RAISED BY ENRON AND OTHER PUBLIC COMPANIES (Mar. 21, 2002), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/032102oraltshlp.htm (stating that 
“disclosure by public companies must be truly informative and timely”, “full and fair”); 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.L. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) (proclaiming the overarching objective 
of the Act as “[t]o protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of 
corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes”). 
179 . See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Speech at the National Association of 
Corporate Directors Leadership Conference 2013, The Path Forward on Disclosure 
(Oct. 15, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/137053
9878806#.Uwn6XIXJzxM (discussing the problem of information overload rendering 
disclosure ineffective and the directions of future reform based on past efforts). See 
generally Arthur J. Radin, Have We Created Financial Statement Disclosure Overload?, CPA J. 
ONLINE, Nov. 2007, http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2007/1107/perspectives/
p6.htm (arguing that the excessively long financial statement disclosures are 
counterproductive and worrisome). 
180. See Letter from Daniel M. Gallagher, Commissioner, US Securities and 
Exchange Commission, to the SEC Staff (Feb. 21, 2014), available at http://
www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540834506#.UwoHf4XJzxM (urging 
the SEC to take on such critical projects as reviewing corporate disclosure regime in 
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require that risk disclosure language relating to the legal 
instability and unpredictability of the VIE structure be in 
boldface and italicized fonts to signal the critical importance of 
the issue.181 Second, such language should be placed at the 
beginning of the risk disclosure section to reduce the likelihood 
that it is overlooked by investors.182 
In sum, Part III advises the SEC to institute precautionary 
regulatory measures with respect to VIEs and recommends two 
such measures that may be implemented in the near future.183 
While US regulatory attention may cause disruptive dislocation 
in the international capital markets, causing immediate 
diminution of the share prices of affected entities, it ultimately 
leads to a more efficient and transparent system, which in turn 
promotes investor confidence in the integrity of the US capital 
markets.184 
                                                                                                                            
2014); supra note 179 and accompanying text (suggesting that current risk disclosure 
practice is ineffective and requires reform). 
181 . See SEC, A PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK: HOW TO CREATE CLEAR SEC 
DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS 49 (Aug. 1998) [hereinafter PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK] 
(noting that boldface text is common in disclosure documents); PLAIN LANGUAGE 
ACTION & INFO. NETWORK, FEDERAL PLAIN LANGUAGE GUIDELINES 88 (May 2011), 
http://www.plainlanguage.gov/howto/guidelines/FederalPLGuidelines/
FederalPLGuidelines.pdf (“Use bold and italics to make important concepts stand 
out.”). 
182. See PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK, supra note 181, at 16 (advising drafters of 
disclosure documents to look through investors’ eyes in deciding where to place 
information); Radin, supra note 179 (“If a company today wanted to hide information, 
but technically be protected, what better place to hide it than in the footnotes to the 
financial statements or in the risk factor and operations sections of the 10-K? This is 
exactly what happened in the case of Enron.”). 
183. See supra Part III.A–.B (discussing the two recommendations). 
184. See Richard Pearson, Looking at Chinese VIE’s, FORBES (Oct. 18, 2012, 1:39 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardpearson/2012/10/18/looking-at-chinese-
vies/ (“If the SEC were to take broader action against all VIE structures, presumably 
they would have to deal with the same implications as the Chinese government, namely 
that the number of companies and the market value that they represent are enormous. 
Any broad based action would cause an immediate and very substantial dislocation in 
the markets.”); Simon Rabinovitch, Appetite for US-listed Chinese Stocks Transcends Audit 
Dispute, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2014, 2:39 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f2d07
dbe-9314-11e3-8ea7-00144feab7de.html#axzz2rqPiReYw (noting that investors are not 
usually known for their long memories, and though US-listed PRC companies were an 
endangered species due to exposed fraud after fraud not too long ago, their stocks 
have rebounded and the market has reopened to new listings). 
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CONCLUSION 
PRC-domiciled VIEs are contract-based investment 
structures engineered to enable non-PRC investors’ de facto 
control over PRC businesses in contravention of Chinese FDI 
restrictions. Contracts made to circumvent existing PRC law are 
not enforceable, and the VIE structure has yet to be explicitly 
approved by the CCP. Further, typical shareholder safeguards 
do not protect the rights of US investors in a VIE arrangement. 
By not directly addressing the legality of VIE or the validity of its 
underlying contracts, the PRC government reserves for itself the 
right to declare its position at a later date, creating substantial 
unpredictability for US investors. The SEC is encouraged to take 
immediate precautionary actions to protect US investors from 
the unique and under-appreciated legal risks of investing in 
PRC-domiciled VIEs. 
